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In the wake of Watergate, Congress enacted a slew of legislative 
reforms aimed at plugging the myriad holes in transparency and oversight 
the scandal laid bare. These included the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
important amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Inspector 
General Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the Federal Election Commission 
Act and creation of the Federal Election Commission, the National 
Emergencies Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the 
Impoundment Control Act. Unlike President Richard Nixon, who resigned on 
the threat of impeachment, President Donald J. Trump was twice impeached 
for alleged abuses in office—and he was twice acquitted in the Senate. 
Arguably, the articles of impeachment did not fully capture his abuses of 
office, including those that culminated in the 482-page report of Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller regarding the 2016 Trump campaign’s cooperation 
with Russian intelligence to influence the election on Trump’s behalf. But that 
was just the beginning. Over the course of four years in office, Trump and his 
enablers in Congress managed to exploit gaps or lapses in the post-
Watergate reform legislation while flouting numerous provisions of the 
Constitution that were not even the focus of Congress post-Watergate—
including the Emoluments Clauses, the Advice and Consent Clause, and 
aspects of the Impeachment Clauses. The Trump years also underscored 
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inadequacies in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the relatively ancient 
legislative process for tallying Electoral College votes. With Democrats now 
controlling both Houses of Congress, as well as the White House under 
President Joe Biden, it is imperative that the legislature step in once again to 
fill the separation of powers vacuum in the breach. To be sure, the Framers 
understood that power corrupts. Despite their expectation that only 
individuals of moral character and fidelity to the rule of law would ascend to 
the presidency, the structure of the Constitution itself underscores the 
foundational aim of accountability; thus, their most powerful creation—the 
Legislative Branch—must not sit idly by. Although this article does not 
(indeed, cannot) purport to lay out in any detail the model features of 
statutory reform measures, it does fill a significant gap in the legal literature: 
a review of the post-Watergate reform legislation and an assessment of how 
it fared through the Trump administration. The article also sketches out 
legislative priorities and needs as a preliminary benchmark for future 
research, analysis, and policy reform. 
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In the Twentieth Century, when people thought of presidential 
scandal, the first administration that often came to mind was that of President 
Richard Nixon. After two impeachments and numerous criminal and civil 
investigations, President Donald J. Trump’s administration became the 
modern model of presidential scandal. Nixon famously resigned his office 
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rather than face likely impeachment over the Watergate scandal.1 In response 
to the corruption laid bare by the Nixon administration, Congress embarked 
on a legislative mission that culminated in a series of statutory reforms to 
make the federal government more transparent and accountable, and thus 
deter future misconduct.2 Congress must do the same—with even more 
vigor—in the wake of the Trump administration. 
This article examines the post-Watergate reforms and the extent to 
which they have been effective, with a specific focus on the ways they were 
tested by the Trump administration. In doing so, it identifies weaknesses 
within current oversight laws and prescribes paths to reinforce the important 
protections they were designed to impose, albeit failingly. Part I provides a 
historical overview of the Nixon administration’s clashes with democratic 
institutions to contextualize the post-Watergate oversight reforms.3 Part I also 
examines the abuses that were only discovered later, after the Watergate 
investigation.4  
Part II details the key provisions of the post-Watergate statutes, 
adding information and context for how these pieces of legislation have 
evolved since their passage.5 Part II’s first topic is agency transparency and 
oversight reforms.6 Implementation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA) and subsequent modifications are discussed within the context of the 
presidential administrations that created a demand for the legislative action.7 
It then addresses the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), which sought to expedite the information disclosure process and 
limit exclusions to public oversight,8 as well as the rise of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was an attempt to limit 
surveillance on American citizens.9 Part II then addresses the statutory 
measures established to limit executive powers after Watergate.10 The article 
explores the objectives of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the 
Impoundment Control Act, and the National Emergencies Act, along with the 
 
1 See Rick Perlstein, Watergate Scandal, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (June 10, 2021), https://www. 
britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal [perma.cc/7RY7-3PEQ] (describing Nixon’s 
resignation and the events motivating that decision). 
2 See SAM BERGER & ALEX TAUSANOVITCH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LESSONS FROM 
WATERGATE: PREPARING FOR POST-TRUMP REFORMS 3–10 (2018) (chronicling the post-
Watergate legislative reforms and explaining how these reforms aimed to create a more 
ethical and transparent government). 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part I.C. 
5 See infra Part II. 




10 See infra Part II.B. 




shortcomings of these three statutes as evidenced under the Trump 
administration.11 Part II concludes with consideration of the watchdog 
mechanisms added in the aftermath of Watergate,12 including the Inspector 
General Act and the Ethics in Government Act, as well as abuses by 
presidents notwithstanding these reforms, congressional failures to renew 
valuable legislation, and recent attempts to revive statutes that lapsed.13 
Part III discusses Trump-era events that tested the post-Watergate 
reforms.14 The discussion covers the Ukraine “quid pro quo” scandal that led 
to his first impeachment, Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation,15 
the Trump campaign’s alleged FISA abuses,16 and the widespread and 
unprecedented removals and intimidation of Inspectors General.17 Part III 
also addresses whether the White House COVID-19 response task force led 
by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner was subject to the mandatory 
disclosure requirements under FACA.18 Next, the article scrutinizes President 
Trump’s failure to appoint enough members to the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) to enable enforcement of campaign finance and election 
laws, as well as his own possible violations of federal election law.19 Finally, 
the article describes President Trump’s use of the National Emergencies Act 
to push his promise to build a wall at the Southern border in contravention of 
Congress,20 as well as the increased delays to the already sizeable FOIA 
backlog under the Trump administration.21  
The article concludes with recommendations for how the post-
Watergate reforms should be reinforced and supplemented with further 
oversight legislation.22 
 
I. WATERGATE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
The Nixon presidency shed light on deficiencies in American 
democratic institutions, and in doing so revealed an urgent need for increased 
 
11 Id. 
12 See infra Part II.C. 
13 Id. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See infra Part III.A–B. 
16 See infra Part III.C. 
17 See infra Part III.D. 
18 See infra Part III.E.i. 
19 See infra Part III.F.i. 
20 See infra Part III.G. 
21 See infra Part III.H. 
22 See infra Conclusion. 
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congressional oversight of the Executive branch.23  Perhaps the most famous 
instance of the Nixon administration’s corruption occurred on October 20, 
1973, through events that came to be known as the “Saturday Night 
Massacre.”24 That evening, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson to fire Archibald Cox, the Special Counsel appointed to 
investigate the suspicious break-in at the Watergate hotel.25 Nixon directed 
Richardson to fire Cox to stifle his investigation involving taped private 
conversations between Nixon and the former Attorney General John 
Mitchell.26 Richardson refused to fire Cox and resigned in protest — as did 
his deputy. Ultimately, Solicitor General Robert Bork agreed to fire Cox, but 
the departure of three high-level officials from the Department of Justice 
undermined Nixon’s goal of ending the investigation.27 Congress later came 
to the conclusion that a more independent investigative mechanism was 
needed to look into future Executive misconduct.28  
The Supreme Court’s ruling on July 24th, 1974, sealed the fate of 
Nixon’s presidency. The Court concluded that Nixon could not “withhold 
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial.”29 Nixon faced a 
criminal subpoena for his Oval Office recordings, and fought to keep the 
tapes secret.30 A unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon rejected his claim 
of an “absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial 
process under all circumstances,” and found that the public interest in 
disclosure outweighed the president’s generalized interest in secrecy.31 In 
response to the ruling, Nixon initially contended he did not have to obey the 
 
23 See Earl Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550–52 
(1974) (“If anything is to be learned from our present difficulties, compendiously known as 
Watergate, it is that we must open our public affairs to public scrutiny on every level of 
government.”). 
24 Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public 




28 Benjamin J. Priester, Paul G. Rozelle & Mirah A. Horowitz, The Independent Counsel 
Statute: A Legal History, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 10 (1999). Ultimately, the Ethics in 
Government Act, discussed in detail in Part II, infra, was passed and established a 
mechanism for the Department of Justice to appoint independent counsels who had greater 
removal protections. 
29 See James M. Naughton, Nixon Slide From Power: Backers Gave Final Push, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 1974, at 51, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/12/archives/nixon-slide-from-
power-backers-gave-final-push-former-defenders.html [perma.cc/N6BK-M597] (quoting 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). 
30 Id. 
31 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). 




Court’s order, stating it was within his constitutional right to flout it.32 But 
after his legal counsel, James St. Clair, advised him that doing so was a sure 
ticket to impeachment and conviction, Nixon issued a statement agreeing to 
comply.33 And so began a fifteen-day series of events that would lead to 
Nixon’s resignation.34 
The fact that Nixon resigned before impeachment proceedings began 
may lead one to believe he did so because he knew what he did was wrong, 
which may actually be the case. The contents of Nixon’s conscience were 
known only to him. What certainly did play a significant role in his decision 
to resign was the lack of support from Congress, including members of his 
Republican party. Both the House and the Senate had a Democratic majority, 
and even though impeachment was highly likely, Nixon initially felt that he 
would secure the thirty-four Senate votes needed to avoid conviction and 
removal.35 Nixon miscalculated the great magnitude of his June 23rd tapes. 
The recordings revealed that he tried to enlist CIA members to convince the 
FBI to collaborate with him and distort the evidence against him in the 
Watergate scandal.36 Knowing that Nixon was not going to resign just 
because someone advised him to, St. Clair and other White House aides took 
it upon themselves to inform Nixon’s closest allies about the contents of the 
tapes so that Nixon would have no choice but to realize that if impeachment 
proceedings went forward, not even those closest to him would be able to 
prevent his conviction and removal.37 
Whereas the House Judiciary Committee was dealing with 
circumstantial evidence and the testimony of John W. Dean, ousted White 
House counsel, in order to build a case against Nixon and his involvement in 
the Watergate break-in, the June 23rd recording transcript was the “smoking 
gun” that not even Nixon’s staunchest supporters could overlook.38 Apart 
from St. Clair, Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, advised Nixon 
that other countries would perceive the U.S. as a weak state if the 
impeachment trial went forward.39 Amid the ongoing Cold War, the President 
needed to appear authoritative to ensure other countries would trust his word 
during times of diplomatic or military crisis.40 St. Clair called a meeting of 
 








40 Naughton, supra note 29 at 2, 12. 
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eight Republican Senate members and informed them of the contents of the 
tapes that were not yet released to the public.41 The members, who risked  
their credibility in preventing Nixon from being impeached, were enraged; 
they had wrongly believed there was no direct evidence linking Nixon to the 
scandal.42  
Shortly thereafter, the same members called for a private meeting 
with Nixon. They were advised by his Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig Jr., that 
when conducting this meeting, they should not be direct in telling Nixon to 
resign. Haig believed that Nixon was close to resigning, but if told to do it, 
he would do the complete opposite.43 When they finally met with Nixon, the 
congressional caucus informed him that he lacked even half of the thirty-four 
votes he needed to avoid conviction and proceeded to list one by one the 
names of both Democrats and Republicans that would vote against him.44 
Nixon listened, and although his departure was inevitable because of the 
evidence stacked against him, some members of Congress mourned his 
departure. On the day of Nixon’s resignation, forty members were invited to 
the White House so that Nixon could thank them for their loyalty and support 
and nearly all of them, including Nixon, wept.45 
The Saturday Night Massacre is perhaps the clearest example of how 
an exceedingly expansive view of Executive power could threaten American 
democracy, especially if there is no “smoking gun” proof like the June 23 
transcripts that not even the staunchest supporter of the president could 
contest. Other examples of his threats to the rule of law nonetheless abound. 
Nixon challenged Congress’s sweeping authority over government 
spending through a coordinated effort to impound funds appropriated for 
federal agencies, including funding for water pollution funds.46 Each year 
 





46 Irwin R. Kramer, The Impoundment Control Act of 1974: An Unconstitutional Solution to 
a Constitutional Problem, 58 UMKC L. REV. 157, 162–63 (1990); see Executive 
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of 
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 3 (1971) (statement of Sen. Sam J. 
Ervin) (“[B]y impounding appropriated funds, the President is able to modify, reshape, or 
nullify completely laws passed by the legislative branch, thereby making legislative policy 
through executive power. Such an illegal exercise of the power of his office flies directly in 
the face of clear constitutional provisions to the contrary.”); see also Kevin Kosar, So…this 
is Nixon’s fault?, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/10/ 
richard-nixon-congressional-budget-control-act-history-000282/ [perma.cc/VTW8-SE99] 
(“The president had been antagonizing Congress by blaming it for budget deficits and 
inflation. John Ehrlichman, a top Nixon adviser, loudly denounced the ‘credit-card 
Congress,’ and likened it to a derelict relative who impoverished a family by running up 
 




between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon administration impounded seventeen to 
twenty percent of all funds appropriated by Congress.47 This was done to 
draw concessions on spending cuts48 and was a direct challenge to Congress’s 
spending power.49 The effort raised fears in Congress that the President, 
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), “holds unprecedented 
control over the resources of the federal government.”50  
Although the Constitution does not exclusively mention 
impoundment as a power vested with the Executive, the President has vast 
administrative powers in the realm of national security as commander-in-
chief.51 In cases like Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held the legislature’s power of the purse allows it to set an expenditure ceiling 
that confines the executive.52 Within those limits, the executive has power to 
control the expenditure of appropriated funds as the administrator of 
government.53 As a result, presidential impoundments had never been 
contested in federal court in the context of national security.54 Nixon tried to 
stretch this power and utilize it in the domestic realm.55 
The Supreme Court stepped in to check Nixon in Train v. City of New 
York,56 the only modern impoundment case to reach the Court. In that case, 
the Court heard a challenge to Nixon’s refusal to spend money appropriated 
 
bills. Nixon upped the pressure by telling Congress to spend no more than $250 billion, and 
by threatening to veto appropriations bills that exceeded this cap.”). “Impoundment” refers 
to the deliberate decision by a President to refuse to allow appropriated funds to be spent. Id. 
47 Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53 
NEB. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974). This constituted more funding than any other president in history. 
48 See Kramer, supra note 46, at 162 (describing how Nixon used impoundments as a tool to 
“eliminate or severely curtail programs that he opposed”). 
49 See Philip Joyce, The Congressional Budget Office at Middle Age 2–3 (Hutchins Ctr. on 
Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at Brookings, Working Paper No. 9, 2015), https://www.brook 
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PJ_WorkingPaper9_Feb11_Final.pdf [perma.cc/5X 
SK-TLDT] (sharing an account of the presidential impoundment strategy that reached its 
zenith during the Nixon administration as a “seven-year budget war” between the executive 
and legislative branches). 
50 See 119 CONG. REC. 19,435 (1973) (statement of Sen. James A. McClure) (entering 
Holmes Alexander’s essay, The Heavy Burden of the Federal Purse, into the record to 
document the public’s reaction to Sen. William Scott's proposal to transfer control of the 
Office of Management and Budget to Congress). 
51 Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s Impoundment of National 
Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 24 (2001). 
52 Id. at 24–25 (citing Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937)). 
53 Brownell, supra note 51, at 24–25. 
54 Id. at 20. 
55 Id. at 46. 
56 420 U.S. 35, 45–46 (1975). 
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under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.57 New York City sued, 
arguing that the language of the Act mandated that all money appropriated 
by Congress be spent.58 Nixon responded that the Constitution granted the 
Executive unlimited discretion to spend funds.59 The Court rejected Nixon’s 
argument and held that the President cannot impound funds that Congress 
intended would be spent.60 Yet there remained significant concern that a 
future President might again attempt to usurp Congress’s power over the 
budget. 
The concern was not unfounded. By 1973, Congress had enacted 470 
statutes that gave the President “extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised 
by the Congress.”61 Because there is no general emergency powers provision 
in Article II of the Constitution, even the legislature must look at the statutes 
it has enacted to determine what exact powers it has delegated to the 
President.62 Among those powers was the ability to “seize property; organize 
and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign military 
forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and 
communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; [and] restrict 
travel . . . .”63 But as the Special Senate Committee on the Termination of the 
National Emergency Act indicated during the Nixon administration, no one 
 
57 Id. at 40–41. A particularly contentious instance of impoundment was Nixon’s refusal to 
spend money appropriated for water pollution control funds. See Stanton, supra note 46, at 
n. 3 (describing the Senate’s reaction to Nixon’s impoundment of the water pollution control 
funds). The President claimed that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, in mandating that all money appropriated by Congress under the Amendments for 
water pollution control be spent, had infringed on the Executive’s Article II authority. Id. at 
3. At the time, Senator Edward Muskie argued that Congress could not have been clearer 
regarding the way the money was to be spent, because the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act amendments which appropriated them were passed overwhelmingly by both the House 
and Senate. Id.at 1–2 n.3 When the President initially vetoed the amendments, the veto was 
overridden immediately by both houses. Id. In light of that reality, Muskie argued, the 
President’s impoundment of the water pollution control funds was particularly egregious. Id. 
58 Train, 420 U.S. at 40. 
59 See Stanton, supra note 47, at 3 (describing how Nixon argued that the mandate that 
required spending the full amount “conflicts with the allocation of executive power to the 
president made by Article II of the Constitution”). 
60See Train, 420 U.S. at 41 (“The sole issue before us is whether the 1972 Act permits the 
Administrator to allot to the States under § 205(a) less than the entire amounts authorized to 
be appropriated by § 207. We hold that the Act does not permit such action and affirm the 
Court of Appeals.”). 
61 S. REP. NO. 93-549, at III (1973). 
62 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (noting that the 
President’s power to issue an executive order directing the seizure of corporate plants must 
stem from an act of Congress or the provisions of the Constitution). 
63 S. REP. NO. 93-549, supra note 61. 




in either the Legislative or Executive branch knew how far those powers 
reached.64  
Nixon’s expansive view of Executive power also put democracy to 
the test when he declared two national emergencies in order to give himself 
undefined, unprecedented powers. Nixon declared the first emergency to 
crush a strike by postal workers.65 The second emergency was declared in 
response to the inflation crisis of 1971, when Nixon claimed he had 
unprecedented authority to impose import controls to control inflation.66 
Some scholars believe the Constitution also grants the President implied 
powers to seize undefined presidential authority in response to a national 
emergency, and at the time few parameters around that authority existed.67 
Yet Nixon’s use of that authority, coupled with the abuses uncovered during 
the Watergate investigation, showed that safeguards were needed to prevent 
presidents from using emergency declarations to circumvent democratic 
procedures.  
  As Congress attempted to carry out investigations of the Nixon 
administration, it was stymied by bureaucratic delays that were enabled by 
what a House Report later characterized as “major deficiencies in the 
administration of the [FOIA].”68 This interference revealed a serious need to 
reform FOIA so that Congress could force executive agencies to comply with 
Congressional oversight requests.69  
 
64 Id. at IV. 
65 Stephanie Jurkowski, Emergency Powers, CORNELL LEGAL INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/emergency_powers [perma.cc/6FBT-3WUH] (July 2017). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. (“The Constitution does not expressly grant the President additional war powers or 
other powers in times of national emergency. However, many scholars think that the Framers 
implied these powers because the structural design of the Executive Branch enables it to act 
faster than the Legislative Branch. Nevertheless, because the Constitution remains silent on 
the issue, the Judiciary cannot grant these powers to the Executive Branch when it tries to 
wield them. The courts will only recognize a right of the Executive Branch to use emergency 
powers if Congress has granted such powers to the President.”). Notably, because the 
Constitution is silent on what these powers are, there is no clear indication where their limits 
lie, and therefore they have been used in a variety of circumstances and have encompassed 
a range of specific functional powers. See id. (listing various national emergencies that 
presidents have declared in the past, including the 1933 banking crisis, the 1950 communism 
scare, the 1970 postal workers strike, and the 1971 inflation emergency). 
68 H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 122 (1974). A full database of the legislative history of FOIA 
and its subsequent Amendments is available at FOIA Legislative History, The National 
Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/foia/foia-legislative-history [perma.cc/8LUY-
Q6VF] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021). 
69 Dan Lopez, Thomas Blanton, Meredith Fuchs & Barbara Elias, Veto Battle 30 Years Ago 
Set Freedom of Information Norms, The National Security Archive, GEO. WASH. UNIV. 
(Nov. 23, 2004), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm [perma.cc/ 
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The investigations also revealed unethical activities related to 
President Nixon’s campaign funds, including the creation of a “slush fund” 
used for everything from funding illegal surveillance of political opponents 
to improvements on Nixon’s summer homes.70 Congress also uncovered the 
so-called “International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) affair,” 
in which a corporation allegedly donated $400,000 to the Nixon campaign in 
order to get the Department of Justice (DOJ) to settle an antitrust lawsuit.71 
These discoveries revealed a need for greater oversight of campaign 
financing.72  
The Watergate investigations also revealed that U.S. intelligence 
agencies had been turned inward on Nixon’s political rivals.73 This effort 
 
59CQ-ET4L]. Ultimately, in response to these deficiencies, Congress passed the 1974 
amendments to FOIA, discussed in detail in Part II, infra. Congress passed the amendments 
twice with a strong enough majority to override President Ford’s initial veto. Robert P. 
Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National Security 
Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 76 (1992). 
President Ford believed judicial in camera review was unconstitutional because he believed 
that it was the role of the executive, not the judiciary, to properly determine whether 
investigative documents could safely be disclosed to the inquiring public. Id. at 78. 
70 John M. Crewdson, Nixon's Taped Remarks on Apparent Slush Fund Called Key Evidence 
in Rebozo Iniquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1974), at 27, available at https://www.nytimes. 
com/1974/12/09/archives/nixons-taped-remarks-onapparent-slush-fund-called-key-evid 
ence-in.html [perma.cc/Q73X-N76H]. 
71 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The I.T.T. Affair and Why Public Financing Matters for Political 
Conventions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (March 19, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org 
/our-work/analysis-opinion/itt-affair-and-why-public-financing-matters-political-
conventions [perma.cc/VSL7-362X]. 
72 Ultimately, this resulted in the creation of the Federal Election Commission and other 
electoral regulatory reforms, discussed in detail in Part II, infra. See also Torres-Spelliscy, 
supra note 71 (explaining the DOJ’s conduct during the ITT affair was illegal when it 
happened under the Tillman Act, and the incident was the impetus for the Tunney Act of 
1974, “which requires anti-trust settlements go before a judge instead of being settled by the 
DOJ alone”). Bi-partisan legislation passed in 2014 rolled back certain public funding 
provisions of the post-Watergate election oversight reforms, but the Tunney Act remained in 
place. Id. 
73 U.S. Senate Hist. Off., Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm [perma.cc/X8PF-97SQ] (“Despite 
these numerous challenges, the Church Committee investigated and identified a wide range 
of intelligence abuses by federal agencies, including the CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, 
and National Security Agency. In the course of their work, investigators identified programs 
that had never before been known to the American public, including NSA’s Projects 
SHAMROCK and MINARET, programs which monitored wire communications to and from 
the United States and shared some of that data with other intelligence agencies. Committee 
staff researched the FBI’s long-running program of ‘covert action designed to disrupt and 
discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order,’ known 
as COINTELPRO. The FBI included among the program’s many targets organizations such 
 




included surveillance conducted by the FBI and CIA.74 While Congress was 
concerned for years that these agencies would inappropriately surveil 
Americans,75 the concerns came to a head during Watergate.76 Nixon 
attempted to use his executive power under the guise of national security to 
create an “intelligence committee” to provide “better intelligence 
operations.”77 Documents relating to this intelligence committee were 
classified as containing top secret content.78 One mission undertaken by this 
committee was investigating who was responsible for publishing the 
Pentagon Papers that detailed U.S. involvement in Vietnam.79 If Nixon had 
suspected certain individuals of committing espionage and revealing 
classified U.S. information, he could—in theory—have taken steps to have 
them federally indicted for having violated the 1917 Espionage Act.80 
Instead, he had intelligence officers burglarize the offices of certain 
suspects.81  
Concerns related to federal advisory committees also arose and 
culminated in the passage of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, discussed 
in Part II, infra, before the investigations even ended.82 In sum, the Watergate 
 
as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and 
individuals such as Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as local, state, and federal elected 
officials.”). 
74 Id. 
75 Concerns about intelligence groups surveilling nonviolent activist groups can be found 
throughout the Congressional Record. See 117 CONG. REC. 13,982 (1971) (statement of Rep. 
James H. Scheuer) (entering Frank Donner, The Theory and Practice of American Political 
Intelligence, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Apr. 22, 1971) into the Congressional Record) (“At an 
ever-increasing rate the activities of antiwar, anti-Establishment, civil rights, black militants, 
student, and youth groups are being recorded and compiled. Lists and dossiers are coded, 
computerized, stored, and made accessible to all branches of the intelligence network . . . 
political intelligence indiscriminately sweeps into its net the mild dissenters along with those 
drawn to violence.”). These groups spanned the American ideological spectrum. See id. 
(“peaceful, moderate, lawful organizations—from the NAACP to the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation—become intelligence targets on the theory that they are linked to 
communism or subversion.”). 
76 EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11451, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (2021) (“Following revelations regarding widespread privacy 
violations by the federal government during the Watergate era, Congress enacted FISA to 
establish guidelines for government collection of foreign intelligence.”). 
77 CIA, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES UNDER FIRE FOR WATERGATE ROLE 58 (2002), available 
at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75b00380r000200010022-9  
[perma.cc/6GRE-RBBP]. 
78 Id. at 58. 
79 Id. at 59. 
80 18 U.S.C § 798 (1996). 
81 CIA, supra note 77, at 59. 
82 BERGER & TAUSANOVITCH, supra note 2. 
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investigations revealed a need for numerous new democratic safeguards to 
keep the executive and the agencies under its command in check.  
 
II. POST-WATERGATE REFORMS 
 
In response to the Nixon administration, Congress passed a series of 
reforms intended to create a more transparent and accountable government. 
The goal was to ensure that officials under the President’s command could 
be held accountable when they abused or exceeded their authority. In 
pursuing this goal, Congress reinforced the external constitutional safeguards 
that allow Congress and the courts to check the Executive. Core to the 
concept of separated powers is the reality that the President has limited, 
implied powers, and may not run the Executive Branch with unconstrained 
discretion. This idea ran directly counter to President Nixon’s own 
conception of presidential powers, which he believed to be unlimited. 
The wide-ranging Watergate reforms may be separated into three 
broad categories. First, in response to clear obfuscation by federal agencies, 
Congress passed administrative oversight measures to increase agency 
transparency and accountability. Second, in order to expressly rebuff Nixon’s 
undemocratic advocacy for a system dominated by the Executive branch, 
Congress passed measures to directly limit the authority of the President. 
Third, to ensure effective investigations within the administrative state and to 
ensure the President cannot unilaterally end investigations, Congress created 
watchdog mechanisms to investigate alleged wrongdoing.  
 
A. Agency Transparency and Oversight Reforms 
 
 1. Federal Advisory Committee Act 
 
One of the first steps Congress took while the Watergate 
investigations were still ongoing was to impose oversight measures on 
shadowy “advisory” committees through the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA). These advisory committees, typically comprised of individuals 
representing special interest groups, have been viewed by presidents and 
legislators across the political spectrum as a potentially corrupting force in 
administrative law.83 The purpose of FACA was two-fold.84 First, it was 
 
83 See WENDY GINSBERG & CASEY BURGAT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44253, FEDERAL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 17 (2016) (presenting the 
history of Congressional oversight of executive advisory committees, including legislation 
passed in 1842 and 1909). 
84 Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
160 A.L.R. Fed. 483, (2000). 




designed to reduce wasteful expenditure on advisory committees.85 Second, 
it was aimed at making de facto presidential advisory committees more 
identifiable and accountable to the public. 86  
FACA was intended to curb the influence of advisory committees87 
by imposing certain processes on federal advisory committees “to ensure that 
advice by the various advisory committees formed over the years is objective 
and accessible to the public.”88 It prescribes standards for agencies to follow 
when they establish advisory committees, creates a way for Congress and the 
Executive to enforce those standards, places temporal limitations on the 
existence of a committee, provides guidelines to reduce the improper 
influence of advisory committees, requires a federal employee to be involved 
in advisory committee meetings, and makes advisory meetings and 
documents available to the public. 89 
In the decades before FACA, advisory committee abuse and waste 
was well known to government officials and the general public.90 Throughout 
the 1950s, DOJ laid out guidelines to curb the influence of private industries 
over the federal government. Executive Order No. 1100791 enforced much of 
the DOJ guidance for committees and set time limits. Circular No. A-63 was 
issued by the Bureau of Budget in 1964 and was later cited by the executive 
branch during Congressional hearings to show that there was no need for 
more legislation with regard to advisory committees.92 
While the House and Senate hammered out details on what would 
become FACA through the Spring of 1972, on June 5th, President Nixon 
signed Executive Order No. 1167193 which instead vested OMB with 
oversight of advisory committees.94 To the extent this was an attempt by 
Nixon to convince Congress that FACA was unnecessary, it was undercut by 




87 GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83, at 3. 
88 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Management Overview, U.S. GEN. SERVS. 
ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104514 [perma.cc/ZYP8-TPZ5] (last updated 
January 28, 2018). 
89 Kemper, supra note 81. 
90 GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83. 
91 Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. § 182 (1962). 
92 GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83. 
93 Exec. Order No. 11,671. 3 C.FR. § 388 (1973). 
94 GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83. 
95 Document for June 17th: Security Officer’s Log of the Watergate Office Building Showing 
Entry for June 17, 1972, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-
doc/index.html?dod-date=617#:~:text=During%20the%20early%20hours%20of,the%20 
Democratic%20National%20Committee%20Headquarters [perma.cc/P8A7-QK8C] (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
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on September 15, 1972,96 when Nixon associates were indicted by a federal 
grand jury for the break-in. Congress passed FACA later in September, and 
President Nixon signed the Act in October.  
FACA was tested in January of 2001, when President George W. 
Bush created the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG),97 
and tapped Vice President Dick Cheney to run it. After the NEPDG published 
a report in May 2001,98 the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch filed suit alleging 
that, because the committee met in private, with non-governmental 
employees, and documents that the committee produced were not made 
public, the committee violated FACA.99 When the organizations requested 
discovery of the committee’s documents, Cheney sought an order of 
mandamus to stop any discovery, which was at first denied.  In 2005, after a 
remand by the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed 
the case, concluding that the NEPDC was not covered by FACA because it 
was not an “advisory committee” within the meaning of the statute. No non-
federal employees had a right to vote on committee matters or exercise veto 
powers, so those members had no duty to the public under FACA.100 After 
the incident, the viability of FACA as a check on Executive branch corruption 
came into question. 
 
 2. 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 
 
Another measure Congress adopted to strengthen oversight was the 
passage of amendments to the Freedom of Information Act to promote 
transparency in government, in recognition that “if the pertinent and 
necessary information on government activities is denied the public, the 
result is a weakening of the democratic process.”101 The amendments 
introduced a number of key reforms, including reforms intended to overcome 
“extraordinary delays” in the FOIA adjudication process by creating 
administrative timetables to control the review process.102 The reforms also 
 
96 Associated Press, From Break-in to Pardon, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 1997), at 29, available at 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-06-08-mn-1346-story.html 
[perma.cc/EK4V-47C9]. 
97 In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
98 NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2001). 
99 Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Pol’y Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2002) 
100 In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 729. 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 123 (1974). 
102 See e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-854, at 165 (1974) (noting the Supreme Court in Renegotiation 
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) held, in the Report’s words, that 
“FOIA confers jurisdiction on the courts to enjoin administrative proceedings pending a 
judicial determination of the applicability of the Act to documents involved in those 
proceedings”). In the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the proposed amendments, to 
 




ensured agencies could not abuse FOIA’s foreign policy exemption for 
inappropriate purposes by providing for in camera review of FOIA denials 
based on the exemption and by narrowing the exemption’s applicability.103  
First, the amendments created procedural administrative timelines to 
force agencies to process FOIA requests at a reasonable pace.104 As amended, 
FOIA provides that when an agency receives a request, it “must determine 
within twenty [working] days . . . whether to comply with such request.”105 
The D.C. Circuit has held that 
in order to make a ‘determination’ within the statutory time 
periods and thereby trigger the administrative exhaustion 
requirement, the agency need not actually produce the 
documents within the relevant time period . . . [b]ut the agency 
must at least indicate within the relevant time period the scope 
of the documents it will produce and the exemptions it will 
claim with respect to any withheld documents.106 
Additionally, Congress created mechanisms to ensure these 
timeframes were complied with, including sanctions on agencies that fail to 
comply.107  
Second, the amendments narrowed FOIA’s foreign policy exemption 
to reduce the ability of agencies to shield documents from requests.108 For 
example, the amendments narrowed the circumstances under which the 
exemption applies.109 They also created a two-part test for administrative 
 
Committee suggested that the amendments address this problem by expediting the timeframe 
upon which administrative determinations to withhold documents could be subject to judicial 
review. Id. 
103 H.R. REP. NO. 4960 (1973). This was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
EPA v. Mink that documents designated as “classified” on foreign policy grounds is an action 
delegated to agencies, not the courts. 410 U.S. 73, 81–82 (1973); S. REP. NO. 98-854, at 166 
(1974). In camera review was included in the final amendments. Id. This reflects the desire 
by Congress to enhance judicial oversight over the FOIA process. See id. 
104 The agency has 20 days after receiving a FOIA request to determine whether to comply 
with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request. 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(6)(A). 
105 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
106 Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 711 F.3d 180, 
189 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
107 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(F)(i). 
108 Id. § 552(b); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 7 (2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/ 
file/1248371/download [perma.cc/L49D-JJ63] (“The 1974 FOIA amendments considerably 
narrowed the overall scope of the Act's law enforcement and national security exemptions, 
and also broadened many of its procedural provisions – such as those relating to fees, time 
limits, segregability, and in camera inspection by the courts.”). 
109 Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, U.S. DEP’T OF 
Just. (1975), https://www.justice.gov/oip/attorney-generals-memorandum-1974-amend 
ments-foia [perma.cc/9TMQ-77HN] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021). 
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officers to apply when determining whether records can be withheld.110 This 
test permits the withholding of matters that are (1) specifically authorized 
under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy, and (2) are in fact properly 
classified pursuant to such Executive Order.111  
As with the foreign policy exemption, the 1974 amendments also 
narrowed the exemption for investigatory records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes.112 The Act was amended to specify six potential 
harms that qualify a document for the exemption.113 Thus, after 
administrators determine a document is an investigatory document compiled 
for law enforcement purposes, they must ask whether releasing the document 
would result in one of those six specific harms.  
Documents withheld under the foreign policy and law enforcement 
exemptions may be reviewed in camera by a court to determine the propriety 
of the withholding under the substantive factors of the Act.114 This review is 
under a de novo standard.115 Any document, regardless of the exemption 
claimed, may be reviewed, even if it contains classified information. Upon 
inspection, any reasonably segregable portion of a record is to be provided 
after appropriate redactions are made.116 While this provides an important 
safeguard, in camera examination is not automatic.117 Before a court orders 
 
110 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
111 Id.; EDWARD H. LEVI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT AND AGENCIES CONCERNING THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT (1975), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/attorney-generals-
memorandum-1974-amendments-foia [https://perma.cc/W7L8-27TR]. 
112 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
113 The six circumstances under which a document may be withheld are if releasing the 
document would: (1) interfere with enforcement proceedings; (2) deprive a person of a right 
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (3) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy; (4) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled 
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an 
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential 
information furnished only by the confidential source; (5) disclose investigative techniques 
and procedures; and (6) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. 
Id. 
114 Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
115 Id. 
116 The agency records sought by a FOIA plaintiff often consist of non-exempt factual 
information intertwined with exempt material. In response to such cases, Congress in 1974 
amended the FOIA to provide that “any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided . . . after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” Lisa A. Krupicka, 
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act—1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 742, 787 
(1985). 
117 Although courts have recognized persuasive policy reasons to adopt a per se rule that in 
camera review will be granted, they have declined to do so because such a per se rule would 
 




inspection, the agency must be given an opportunity to establish that the 
documents are clearly exempt.118 Since 1974, courts have almost always 
ruled in favor of the agency after conducting review.119 Commentators have 
argued that courts’ deference to agencies regarding foreign policy 
information misreads the history of the FOIA, and deference is not an 
adequate reflection of the responsibilities assigned to the courts in reviewing 
FOIA cases.120 
 
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
 
An additional agency oversight measure Congress passed in 1978 was 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which limited electronic 
surveillance of Americans to circumstances in which agencies were 
collecting foreign intelligence.121 Senator Ted Kennedy, one of the law’s 
proponents, explained the legislature’s motivations for FISA, stating that “the 
full Senate at long last has the opportunity to place foreign intelligence 
electronic surveillance under the rule of law . . . The abuses of recent history 
sanctioned in the name of national security . . . highlight the need for more 
effective statutory controls and congressional oversight.”122 These abuses 
 
contravene the clear grant by Congress of broad discretion to trial judges. See Ctr. for Auto 
Safety v. EPA, 731 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to adopt a per se rule requiring the 
court to conduct an in camera review of documents claimed to be exempted per Exemption 
5 of FOIA and noting that such a rule would oppose Congressional intention to afford trial 
judges broad discretion on the issue). 
118 S. REP. No. 98-854, at 166 (1974). 
119 See Deyling, supra note 69, at 90 (“If weighed at all, plaintiff's evidence is never strong 
enough to overcome what has become a de facto presumption of government victory once 
reasonably specific government affidavits are filed.”). 
120 Id. (“This article contends that one reason plaintiffs seldom persuade courts to order the 
government to release ‘secret’ information is that judicial treatment of these cases fails to 
fully implement the reforms Congress intended when it passed the 1974 amendments. Rather 
than expanding the scope of judicial inquiry into the procedural and substantive legality of 
withholding information, opinions issued both before and after the 1974 amendments have 
established a lenient standard of review in FOIA national security cases. That standard, in 
essence, will validate any ‘reasonable’ executive agency decision to withhold such 
information.”). 
121 See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11451, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (2021) (“FISA defines ‘[f]oreign intelligence 
information’ as information relating to a foreign power or that generally concerns the ability 
of the United States to protect against international terrorism or a potential attack by a foreign 
power or agent of a foreign power. Though Congress initially limited FISA to regulating 
government use of electronic surveillance, Congress subsequently amended FISA to regulate 
other intelligence-gathering practices, such as physical searches, the use of pen registers and 
trap and trace devices and compelling the production of certain types of business records.”) 
(citation omitted). 
122 124 CONG. REC. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward “Ted” Kennedy). 
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included use of warrantless electronic and physical surveillance on anti-war 
protestors, a member of Congress, and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.—all made 
public after Watergate.123  
The Department of Justice has further explained that “[t]hrough FISA, 
Congress sought to provide judicial and congressional oversight of foreign 
intelligence surveillance activities while maintaining the secrecy necessary 
to effectively monitor national security threats. FISA was initially enacted in 
1978 and sets out procedures for physical and electronic surveillance and 
collection of foreign intelligence information.”124 FISA has been amended to 
address “electronic surveillance, pen registers, trap and trace devices, 
physical searches, and business records.”125  
FISA also provides a framework to monitor electronic surveillance by 
federal agencies and safeguard against abuse.126 It contains several important 
provisions. First, it provides procedural safeguards with which agencies must 
comply.127 Second, it establishes a special court—known as Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—for purposes of FISA oversight and 
review.128 The FISC is composed of federal judges appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, it creates a probable cause standard 
of proof for courts to apply in evaluating applications for FISA warrants.129 
Fourth, it forbids the covert surveillance of American citizens under the 
Act.130 
FISA allows agencies only to surveil “agents of a foreign power.”131 
The criteria to determine whether someone is an agent of a foreign power 
vary depending on whether an individual is an American citizen.132 For 
noncitizens, an “agent of a foreign power” includes not only foreign 
 
123 James G. McAdams, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, An Overview, FED. L. 
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., 4–5, https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported 
_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-
subject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf [perma.cc/387G-CLSF] (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
124 BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 (FISA) (2013), https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/ 
statutes/1286 [perma.cc/Y6AL-64VC]. 
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., Cedric Logan, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 209, 219–21 (2011) (discussing the FISA framework’s safeguards against abuse by 
governmental electronic surveillance, known commonly as “The Wall.”). 
127 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813. 
128 Id. §§ 1801–1885(c). 
129 Id. §1805(a)(2). 
130 Id. §1802(a)(1). 
131 Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A). 
132 See ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 
17 (2015)(stating that the criteria to determine whether someone is an agent of a foreign 
power varies depending on the citizenship status of the potential agent). 




governments, but also “factions of foreign nations; entities that foreign 
governments control; international terrorist groups; foreign-based political 
organizations; and foreign entities engaged in the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.”133  By contrast, an American qualifies as an “agent of a 
foreign power” only if they have some connection to criminal activity.134 This 
was meant to protect Americans from surveillance based only on tenuous 
connections to foreign entities. Congress did not anticipate this would create 
significant roadblocks to legitimate surveillance because it anticipated that 
most of the persons under surveillance would be violating the criminal 
espionage laws.135 
Furthermore, FISA only permits surveillance of agents of foreign 
entities for the purpose of obtaining “foreign intelligence information.” 
Congress specifically narrowed the definition of foreign intelligence 
information to exclude information such as the opinions of congressional 
members on foreign relations.136 To that end, FISA requires a showing that 
any surveillance of a United States “person” is “necessary,” not just relevant, 
to the conduct of foreign affairs.137  
Through the 1990s there was an effort to make sure that the “primary 
purpose” of FISA surveillance was securing foreign intelligence as opposed 
to a criminal investigation.138 This “primary purpose” standard created a 
“wall” between the foreign intelligence investigations done with FISA 
surveillance and criminal investigations done by other law enforcement 
agencies.139  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act diminished both the “wall” and the 
“primary purpose” standard. In November of 2002, the U.S. Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR)—the appellate court 
charged with reviewing decisions the FISC—met for its first time ever and 
overturned the FISC’s holding that the counterintelligence branches of the 
FBI and DOJ could not share FISA information with the criminal prosecution 
 
133Id. at 22. 
134Id. 
135 S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 21 (1978). 
136 See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 132, at 17 (“Senators were concerned that the definition 
of ‘foreign intelligence information’ in an early draft of the bill was too broad because it 
went beyond national security to include information on ‘the conduct of the foreign affairs 
of the United States.’ One Senator wrote to the Chair of the Intelligence Committee pointing 
out that the views of members of Congress could ‘easily be classified as information 
“‘essential to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States,”’ suggesting that 
Congress itself could be surveilled under FISA.”). 
137 Id. 
138 McAdams, supra note 123, at 4–5. 
139 Id. at 5. 
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branches of the agencies.140 In overturning the FISC, the FISCR cited the 
congressional intent behind the PATRIOT Act that law enforcement and 
foreign intelligence officials better collaborate to prevent future terrorist 
attacks.141 The PATRIOT Act also changed the standard for FISA 
surveillance from the “primary purpose” standard to a standard “that a 
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence 
information”142—a much lower bar to clear. 
 
B. Measures to Limit Executive Powers 
 
 1. 1974 FECA Amendments and the creation of the FEC 
 
The Watergate investigations uncovered a number of shady uses by 
the Nixon campaign of campaign contributions. Scholars have explained 
“[t]he 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 
responded directly to the abuses of the 1972 campaign.”143 The goal of the 
amendments was to preserve the ability of ordinary citizens to make 
contributions to their preferred candidates, but eliminate the ability of 
corporations and wealthy individuals to have a disproportionate influence 
over the political process.144 The legislature considered radical reforms to 
American campaign finance, including the introduction of a public campaign 
finance system.145 However, the legislature dropped that idea in favor of a 
model in which private contributions were preserved, with limits enforced by 
a centralized body, the FEC. 146 This model represented a compromise 
between the most hardcore campaign finance reform advocates and moderate 
colleagues. The compromise preserved private contributions in exchange for 
increased spending limits for House and Senate campaigns and an FEC model 
in which the Commission was composed of a multi-member, bipartisan, 
 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 7–8. 
142 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B). 
143 BERGER & TAUSANOVITCH, supra note 2, at 7; see also Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. 
Bowman, Coordinated Expenditure Limits: Can They Be Saved? 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 133, 
134 (2000) (noting that the legislative record before Congress when it passed the 1974 
Amendments “was replete with specific examples of improper attempts to obtain 
governmental favor in return for large campaign contributions,” and that “[r]evelations of 
huge contributions from the dairy industry, a number of corporations (illegally) and 
ambassadors and potential ambassadors . . . dramatize[d] . . . the widespread concerns over 
the problem of undue influence”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
144 120 CONG. REC. 10,342 (1974). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 




supervisory board.147 The new limits set campaign contribution caps at 
$1,000 from individuals and $5,000 from political action committees 
(PACs).148 They also limited individual expenditures on behalf of candidates 
to $1,000, though this provision was later ruled unconstitutional in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.149 Additionally, limits were placed 
on the amount campaigns were permitted to spend on races.150 
While the new campaign limits were strong, they would not be 
effective unless they were paired with an enforcement mechanism.151 The 
FEC consists of six presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed 
commissioners, as well as one non-voting staffer from both the House and 
the Senate.152 Commissioners serve for six years and no more than three may 
belong to the same political party at one time.153 Their terms are staggered so 
two commissioners are supposed to be appointed every two years.154 While 
many decisions made by the Commission require a mere majority vote to take 
effect, the most important decisions require four votes.155 This means that a 
quorum is required for the Commission to initiate civil enforcement actions 
 
147 See Campaign Financing Reform, 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2691 (Oct. 5, 1974) 
(explaining the terms of the compromise in detail); see also Debra Burke, Twenty Years After 
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who’s Running Now, 99 
DICK. L. REV. 357, 362–63 (1995) (“The compromise passed both chambers and became 
law, representing the greatest reform in the electoral process since the passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.”). 
148 52 U.S.C. § 30116. 
149 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“Limits on 
independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chilling effect extending well beyond the 
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is 
not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”). In Citizens United, the Supreme 
Court famously held that corporate monetary expenditures for “express advocacy” in favor 
of a political candidate are equivalent to speech, and therefore are protected under the First 
Amendment. While some contribution limits in the original FECA text are constitutional 
because they further an important government interest in preventing corruption (such as 
direct contributions to candidates), others were held unconstitutional bars on protected 
speech. Id. at 340 (“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it 
[whether] by design or inadvertence. Laws [that burden political] speech are ‘subject to strict 
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”). 
150 52 U.S.C. § 30116(b). 
151 See Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-
and-history/ [perma.cc/696Y-49XD] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“[W]ithout a central 
administrative authority, the campaign finance laws were difficult to enforce. Following 
reports of serious financial abuses in the 1972 presidential campaign, Congress amended the 
Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974 to set limits . . . The 1974 amendments also 
established an independent agency, the FEC. The FEC opened its doors in 1975.”). 
152 52 U.S.C. § 30106. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. § 30106, 30107(6)–(9). 
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for FECA violations, investigate potential FECA violations, issue advisory 
opinions, or issue rules.156 Without a quorum sitting on the FEC, FECA is 
effectively unenforceable.  
 
 2. Impoundment Control Act 
 
Congress passed the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) in 1974, 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Train,157 discussed in Part I, 
supra, to place express limits on the Executive’s authority to impound 
funds.158 Congress’s motivating concern was a President substituting his own 
policy judgment for express statutory prerogatives set by Congress.159 When 
President Nixon impounded the water pollution control funds at issue in 
Train, he did so based on policy preferences that had been expressly rejected 
when Congress overrode his veto. This circumvention of the veto was the 
root of Congress’s concerns, rather than Richard Nixon’s specific 
motivations. Thus, the objective of the Act was to assure that the practice of 
impounding funds does not become a mechanism for furthering the 
President’s policy agenda at the expense of Congress’s agenda.160  
 
156 Id. 
157 According to the House Budget Committee website, “Congress passed the ICA in 
response to President Nixon’s executive overreach—his Administration refused to release 
Congressionally appropriated funds for certain programs he opposed. While the U.S. 
Constitution broadly grants Congress the power of the purse, the President—through the 
White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and executive agencies—is 
responsible for the actual spending of funds. The ICA created a process the President must 
follow if he or she seeks to delay or cancel funding that Congress has provided.” The 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974: What Is It? Why Does It Matter?, H. COMM. ON THE 
BUDGET  (Oct. 23, 2019) https://budget.house.gov/publications/report/impoundment-
control-act-1974-what-it-why-does-it-matter [perma.cc/Z3VC-AR6W] [hereinafter H. 
COMM. ON THE BUDGET]. 
158See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-331564, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET—WITHHOLDING OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE 5 (2016). (discussing the 
direct limits expressed upon the Executive’s authority to impound funds). 
159 Thus, it doesn’t matter if withholding the aid was for proper or corrupt reasons. It doesn’t 
matter what the reasons are at all. Congress specifically passed this law because it didn’t 
believe the President was a good person to be making this decision. See e.g., H. COMM. ON 
THE BUDGET, supra note 157 (explaining Congress’ concern that President Nixon had 
usurped the constitutional role of Congress by substituting his policy judgment for that of 
the legislature). 
160 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 100-313, at 66–67 (1987). See also S. REP. NO. 93-688, at 
75 (1974); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158, at 5 (“The Constitution grants the 
President no unilateral authority to withhold funds from obligation. See B-135564, July 26, 
1973. Instead, Congress has vested the President with strictly circumscribed authority to 
impound, or withhold, budget authority only in limited circumstances as expressly provided 
in the ICA. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–688.”). 




To prevent a rogue president from withholding funds, the ICA 
imposes strict procedures which the president must follow to impound funds. 
161 The Act operates on the premise that the president is required to obligate 
funds appropriated by Congress, unless otherwise authorized.162 Before an 
impoundment can occur, the president must send a “special message” 
specifying “the amount of budget authority which he proposes to be rescinded 
or which is to be so reserved” and “the reasons why the budget authority 
should be rescinded or is to be so reserved.”163  
Impoundments may take two forms: deferrals and rescissions.164 A 
deferral is a temporary withholding of funds. A deferral may not last longer 
than the end of the fiscal year in which the President communicates a message 
of the impoundment to Congress.165 There are only three specific 
circumstances in which the President may defer funding for a program.166 
Furthermore, whether a deferral can actually occur ultimately depends on 
whether Congress approves of the deferral after being notified of the 
president’s special message.167  
Rescissions are permanent cancellations of funds.168 As with a 
deferral, the president must send a special message to Congress to trigger a 
rescission.169 However, the special message requesting a recession must 
explain the proposed rescission, the reasons for it, and its budgetary, 
economic, and programmatic effects.170 Like a deferral, Congress must 
approve a rescission. However, upon delivery of the special message, the 
president may withhold funding for up to forty-five legislative days.171 If a 
law approving the rescission is not enacted at the end of that timeframe, the 
money must be released.172  The special messages accompanying a request 
 
161 Allan Lichtman, What Law Did Donald Trump Break?, THE HILL (Jan. 23, 2020),  
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/479547-what-law-did-donald-trump-break 
[perma.cc/TPR8-LA85]. 
162 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158, at 5 (“An appropriations act is a law 
like any other; therefore, unless Congress has enacted a law providing otherwise, the 
President must take care to ensure that appropriations are prudently obligated during their 
period of availability.”). 
163 2 U.S.C. § 683(a). 
164 See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157 (stating impoundments may take two 
forms of either deferrals or recessions). 
165 2 U.S.C. § 684. 
166 Those three circumstances are: when providing for contingencies; achieving budgetary 
savings made possible through improved operational efficiency; and as specifically provided 
by law. Id. § 684. 
167 Id. § 683(b). 
168 Id. § 683. 
169 Id. § 683(a). 
170 Id. § 683(a)(1)–(5); H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157. 
171 2 U.S.C. § 683(b). 
172 H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157. 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
62 
for impoundment, regardless of whether it is a deferral or rescission, must 
provide detailed and specific reasoning to justify the withholding, as set out 
in the ICA.173  
However, if funds are impounded in violation of the ICA, the 
enforcement mechanism to free those funds is weak. The Act authorizes the 
Comptroller General to initiate a civil action against any party preventing the 
allocation of funds,174 but there are no specific penalties imposed on agencies. 
In modern times, this has proven to be a flaw in the Act’s efficacy. 
In addition to the prohibition on executive impoundments, the Act 
also created the Congressional Budget Office—a nonpartisan, independent 
legislative agency that estimates the effects of legislation on the federal 
budget.175 It also directed the congressional budget committees to project 
spending for the next fiscal year. 176 
 
 3. National Emergencies Act 
 
Enacted in 1976, the National Emergencies Act (NEA) created a 
formal process which the President must follow to declare a state of 
emergency,177 including publishing notice of the emergency in the Federal 
Register and transmitting notice directly to Congress.178 Once an emergency 
is declared, it may last up to one year, unless the President takes formal action 
to continue it.179 Under this scenario, Congress retains authority to terminate 
the emergency after the one year mark.180 The Act also requires the President 
to report which emergency powers he intends to utilize during the emergency, 
and what expenditures will be made in exercise of those authorities.181 
 
 
173 2 U.S.C. §§ 683–84. 
174 Id. § 687. 
175 See A Short Primer on the Congressional Budget Office, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. 
BUDGET (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/short-primer-congressional-budget-
office [perma.cc/3T58-WPEZ] (“Generally, CBO ‘scores’ the cost of legislation by 
estimating the effect it might have on revenue and spending relative to the CBO baseline. 
For example, if a program was projected to cost $100 billion over ten years under CBO's 
baseline and would cost $90 billion under new legislation, that legislation would be scored 
as saving $10 billion.”). 
176 See Joyce, supra note 49, at 3 (stating that the Committee was to “propose procedures for 
improving congressional control over budgetary outlay and receipt totals and to assure full 
coordination of an overall view of each year’s budgetary outlays with an overall view of the 
anticipated revenue for that fiscal year”). 
177 50 U.S.C. § 1631. 
178 Id. §§ 1621, 1631. 
179 Id. § 1601. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. § 1641. 




There are currently just over thirty active national emergencies, 
ranging in age from the 1979 sanctions on Iran to President Trump’s order to 
redirect military funds to build a border wall.182 The vast majority of active 
emergencies are economic sanctions on foreign nations controlled by the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).183 Although the 
NEA requires both Houses of Congress to convene to discuss ending 
emergencies declared by the President within six months of their 
declaration,184 neither House has actually held meetings.185 
 
C. Watchdog Mechanisms 
 
1. Inspector General Act 
 
In addition to transparency safeguards, Congress created offices of 
inspectors general in various agencies to serve as internal agency watchdogs. 
The concept of an “Inspector General” (IG) existed since the 1950s.186 
However, the Watergate investigations uncovered mismanagement of 
administrative programs and weaknesses within internal investigative 
units.187 The Inspector General Act of 1978 (IGA) was put in place “as a 
means of ensuring integrity and accountability in the Executive Branch.”188 
It created offices of inspectors general (OIGs) at twelve federal agencies, later 
expanded to 73.189 The law190 empowers OIGs to audit and investigate 
 
182 Kathy Gilsinan, In 1995, the U.S. Declared a State of Emergency. It Never Ended, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/ 
trump-renews-24-year-old-terrorism-state-emergency/581050/?utm_medium=offsite&utm_ 
source=yahoo&utm_campaign=yahoo-non-hosted [perma.cc/B54Y-9V8E]. 
183 ANDREW BOYLE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CHECKING THE PRESIDENT’S SANCTION 
POWERS (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/BCJ-128%20I 
EEPA%20report.pdf [perma.cc/CL9V-TCQX] (documenting that the IEEPA was the sole or 
primary authority for 65 of 71 emergency declarations since 1976). 
184 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b). 
185 Chris Edelson, An Expert on National Emergencies Explains Whether Trump Declaring 
One Over the Southern Border is Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/congress-has-the-power-to-end-a-national-emergency-
2019-1 [perma.cc/GX6C-79WH]; Catherine Padhi, Emergencies Without End: A Primer on 
Federal States of Emergency, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/emer 
gencies-without-end-primer-federal-states-emergency [perma.cc/3L28-3KZX]. 
186 KATHRYN A. FRANCIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45450, STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL 
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 1 (2019). 
187 Id. at 1. 
188 About the OIG, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.ssa.gov/ 
about-oig [perma.cc/5769-9GYM] (last visited June 30, 2018) [hereinafter About the OIG]. 
189 MORTON ROSENBERG, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING 
103 (2009), available at https://archive.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ 
Chapter-9.pdf. [perma.cc/GK9T-BQAN]. 
190 See 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 (vesting Inspectors General with authority to oversee agencies). 
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agencies, to report the results of these investigations to Congress, and to make 
recommendations to resolve problems that are uncovered.191 The legislative 
history of the Act provides further insight into its general purpose. Congress 
believed expanding IGs to more agencies would address the issues made clear 
by Watergate. Congress also believed that IGs needed to be independent to 
fulfill their purpose.192  
The IGA directs IGs to serve three statutory purposes.193 First, IGs 
are expected “to conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to 
programs and operations of” the agencies in which their office resides. 
Second, they should “provide leadership and coordination,” and 
recommendations designed to promote “economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness in the administration of, and to prevent and detect fraud and 
abuse in,” administrative programs.194 Third, IGs are expected “to provide a 
means for keeping the head of the [host agency] and the Congress fully and 
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 
administration of” agency programs and operations.195 
The IGA further empowers IGs to accomplish these purposes through 
substantive provisions. First, it authorizes specific OIGs in key federal 
departments. Originally, the Act applied to twelve agencies: the Department 
of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, the Department of the Interior, the Department of 
Labor, the Department of Transportation, the Community Services 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services 
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
Small Business Administration, and the Veterans’ Administration. Over time, 
OIGs have been established in many other agencies throughout the federal 
government.196 
Second, the Act contains appointment and removal procedures to 
insulate IGs from political pressure. An IG is appointed by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, and may be removed by the President, 
or transferred elsewhere within the agency.197 An agency head or subordinate 
may not prevent or prohibit an IG investigation, but the Act does not 
otherwise provide protection for IGs.198 The President may remove an IG and 
 
191 About the OIG, supra note 188. 
192 FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 21. 
193 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 2(1)–(3). 
194 Id. § 2(2). 
195 Id. § 2(3). 
196 A full directory of the 73 federal inspectors general is available at Inspectors General 
Directory, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, 
https://www.ignet.gov/content/inspectors-general-directory [perma.cc/6YCB-6MKP] (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2021). 
197 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 3. 
198 Id. § 3(a). 




need only transmit a message to Congress communicating the reason for 
removal at least thirty days prior to it occurring.199 
Third, the Act imposes substantive duties on Inspectors General.200 
These duties include overseeing audits and investigations relating to the 
programs and operations of the host agency;201 making recommendations to 
Congress in semiannual reports for the prevention and detection of fraud and 
abuse;202 supervising activities carried out or financed by the host agency for 
the purpose of promoting agency efficiency or preventing and detecting fraud 
and abuse;203 overseeing relationships between the host agency and other 
federal, state, and local agencies, and nongovernmental entities regarding 
agency programs;204 and keeping both the agency head and Congress “fully 
and currently informed” concerning fraud, abuse, and other serious 
problems.205  
Fourth, the Act empowers IGs to conduct independent internal 
investigations.206 It guarantees timely access to agency records,207 authority 
to interview agency officials under oath,208 prompt access to the agency 
head,209 authority to appoint his/her own subordinates,210 and authority to 
enter into contracts for the purposes of carrying out investigations.211 Because 
IGs report to both agency heads and Congress, they are well positioned to 
advise both parties on how to improve program administration and 
congressional oversight.212 
The Congressional Research Service notes “Congress has 
substantially amended the IG Act three times since its enactment . . . . The 
amendments generally aimed to expand the number of statutory IGs and 
 
199 Id. § 3(b). 
200 Id. § 4(a)(1)–(5). 
201 Id. § 4(a)(1). 
202 Id. §§ 4(a)(2), 5. 
203 Id. § 4(a)(3). 
204 Id. § 4(a)(4). 
205 Id. § 4(a)(5). 
206 Id. § 6(a)(1). 
207 Id. 
208 See Id. § 6(a)(5) (stating that the Inspector General can have “direct and prompt access” 
to agency officials). 
209 Id. § 6(a)(6). 
210 Id. § 6(a)(7). 
211 Id. § 6(a)(9). 
212 See FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 1 (explaining that “to execute their missions, IGs lead 
offices of inspector general (OIGs) that conduct various reviews of agency programs and 
operations—including audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations—and provide 
findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to carry out 
their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant 
agency records and information, and report findings and recommendations directly to 
Congress”). 
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enhance their independence, transparency, and accountability.”213 These 
many amendments reflect the continuing need for Inspectors General 
throughout government and the lingering barriers to effective oversight. 
In 1988, Congress amended the Act to create additional IGs in the 
Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, and the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration.214 It also brought IGs who pre-dated the 
original Act, such as the Inspector General for the Department of Energy, into 
conformity with the Act. 215 Furthermore, it separated the process for 
appropriating money to OIGs from the process used for the host agency. 216 
In 2008, Congress passed the Inspector General Reform Act in 
response to several incidents that revealed issues with IGs’ independence. For 
example, Department of State Inspector General Howard Krongard allegedly 
interfered with numerous ongoing investigations to protect the State 
Department and White House from embarrassment during the George W. 
Bush administration.217 The Inspector General Reform Act established the 
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). This is 
“an independent entity established within the executive branch to address 
integrity, economy and effectiveness issues that transcend individual 
Government agencies and aid in the establishment of a professional, well-
trained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of Inspectors General 
 
213 Id. Those amendments were the IGA Amendments of 1988, the IG Reform Act of 2008, 
and the IG Empowerment Act of 2016. Pub. L. 100-504; Pub. L. 110-409; Pub. L. 114-317. 
214 See generally Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, § 102(a), 
102 Stat. 2515, 2515 (stating the Amendments and the date they were ratified). 
215 FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 3; Pub. L. No. 100-504, § 102(a). 
216 FRANCIS, supra note 188, at 34. 
217 See “Improving Government Accountability Act,” H. REP. NO.110-354, H. COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT & GOVERNMENT REFORM, 110 Cong. 1st. Session, at 9 (2007) (“According to 
current and former employees of the Office of Inspector General, Mr. Krongard's strong 
affinity with State Department leadership, support for the current administration, and partisan 
political ties have led him to halt investigations, censor reports, and refuse to cooperate with 
law enforcement agencies.”). The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
pointed to multiple other instances of Bush Administration inspectors general either abusing 
their authority or being pressured by political officials to do so. These incidents were seen 
as a sign that IGs themselves needed to be overseen. Thus, the CIGIE was formed to allow 
IGs to oversee their own peers. See id. at 9 (enumerating the various other instances of abuse 
of authority or political pressure on inspectors general prior to 2007 during the Bush 
Administration). 




(OIG).”218 CIGIE coordinates and oversees IGs across federal agencies.219 
The Inspector General Reform Act also strengthened IG independence in a 
number of ways, including additional budgetary independence.220 
On December 16, 2016, perhaps due to concerns related to the 
incoming Trump administration, President Barack Obama signed the 
Inspector General Empowerment Act into law.221 “Among its provisions, the 
IG Empowerment Act confirms that IGs are entitled to full and prompt access 
to agency records, thereby eliminating any doubt about whether agencies are 
legally authorized to disclose potentially sensitive information to IGs.” 222 
This was intended to make it easier for IGs to conduct audits, reviews, and 
investigations in an independent manner. Additionally, it directed CIGIE to 
resolve jurisdictional disputes between IGs.223 The Act further required IGs 
to submit any documents containing recommendations for corrective action 
to agency heads and congressional committees.”224 All of these changes were 
intended to bolster the independence and efficacy of IGs across the federal 
government. 
In general, violations of the IGA relate to two distinct situations. First 
are situations in which an agency unreasonably refuses to comply with an IG 
investigation. Agencies are mandated to make information available to IGs 
in a timely fashion and to comply with lawfully issued subpoenas.225 The 
Attorney General promulgates regulations governing the enforcement of 
these authorities.226 Because of this, it is DOJ, and not individual IG offices, 
 
218 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, OVERSIGHT.GOV, 
https://oversight.gov/inspectors-general/council-inspectors-general-integrity-and-efficiency 
[perma.cc/QA5P-3W2M] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“The statutory mandate of the 
Integrity Committee (IC) of CIGIE is to receive, review, and refer for investigation 
allegations of wrongdoing made against Covered Persons, and to ensure the fair, consistent, 
timely, and impartial disposition of allegations that fall within the IC’s statutory mandate.”). 
219 See id. (explaining that the CIGIE was established to address integrity, economy, and 
effectiveness issues that help oversee the successful functioning of the OIG).; see also 
FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 13 (discussing how the OIG is governed and managed). 
220 Id. at 14. 
221 IG Act History, OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.ignet.gov/content/ig-act-history 
[perma.cc/RY96-WSVE] (last visited Apr. 12. 2020). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 3. 
225 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 6. 
226 See id. § 6I(4) (stating that the Attorney General shall promulgate guidelines to govern 
law enforcement powers); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR OFFICES OF 
INSPECTORS GENERAL WITH STATUTORY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY, OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (2005), available at https://www.ignet.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/agleguidelines.pdf (describing that the Attorney General promulgates 
regulations pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978 and its Amendments) 
[perma.cc/V8S2-2FK5]. 
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that actually enforce IGs’ investigative authorities.227 This means that DOJ 
may make arrests when an IG identifies a criminal offense, and may initiate 
civil action against anyone who defies a lawfully obtained subpoena or 
records request. 
Second are situations in which an official retaliates against 
whistleblowers who notify IGs of ongoing problems. Agencies may not 
retaliate against whistleblowers who bring complaints to an inspector 
general.228 The IGA does not itself provide a mechanism to enforce 
whistleblower protections. However, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989 created formal enforcement authorities an inspector general may 
exercise in response to an apparent reprisal.229 
 
2. Ethics in Government Act 
 
The Ethics in Government Act, sometimes referred to as the 
independent counsel law, is another watchdog statute passed in response to 
problems within the Nixon administration. It was intended to eliminate 
corruption in the federal government by requiring government officials to 
disclose information regarding their financial interests,230 restricting the 
ability of government officials to move into regulated industries after leaving 
the government,231 and creating an Office of Ethics in the Civil Service 
Commission to oversee the administration of the law.232 This was in response 
to concerns that too many members of the civil service were leaving 
government jobs and entering regulated industries, which created the 
appearance of a corrupt administrative state.233 
The Act is best known for creating the position of “special counsel,” 
later re-identified in 1988 as an “independent counsel,” within the 
Department of Justice.234 The independent counsel position served as 
 
227 Id. 
228 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 7. This does not apply to whistleblowers who knew or should have 
known that their complaint was premised on false information. Id. 
229 Id. 
230 CONG. REC. S. 13,329 (May 3, 1977). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (“The provisions of the Act would strike a careful balance between the rights of these 
individuals to their privacy and the right of the American people to know that their public 
officials are free from conflicts of interest.”). 
233 See CONG. REC. H30,419 (1978) (“[W]hat this is doing really is preventing an employee 
from going back to the agency in which he served in a responsible position with some kind 
of business with that same agency.”); see also CONG. REC. S13,329 (1977) (“This approach 
will eliminate all appearance of high-level interference in sensitive investigations and 
prosecutions. The American people must be assured that no one, regardless of position, is 
above the law.”). 
234 Levin & Bean, supra note 24, at 14. 




independent prosecutor insulated from pressure by the President, whose role 
is to investigate allegations of misconduct by high-level political officials.235 
The independent counsel was not a standing position, but instead was 
temporarily appointed by the Attorney General once certain conditions were 
met.236 In this way, the Act provided a framework under which the Attorney 
General may decide whether an independent counsel should be appointed, 
rather than requiring one be appointed at all times.237  
Congress’s goal was “to establish ‘a neutral procedure for resolving 
the conflict of interest that arises when the Attorney General must decide 
whether to pursue allegations of wrongdoing leveled against . . . [his] close 
political associates.’”238 Recognizing damage done by Watergate to the 
public’s trust in government, President Carter strongly supported the 
independent counsel provisions of the Act, saying they would “eliminate all 
appearance of high-level interference in sensitive investigations and 
prosecutions. The American people must be assured that no one, regardless 
of position, is above the law.”239 In 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute against Article II challenges in Morrison v. 
Olson.240 
However, in 1999, Congress allowed the independent counsel 
provisions of the Act to sunset.241 This was likely because, as the law was 
originally designed, the decision of whether to appoint an independent 
counsel was left entirely to the Attorney General, and the influence Congress 
had to initiate investigations was “very limited.”242  
Notably, the law has previously been allowed to expire in the past 
only to be resuscitated later, as happened in 1994 when Congress renewed 
the law (which had expired in 1992) to appoint Ken Starr to investigate 
 
235 Priester et al., supra note 28, at 8-9. 
236 See id. at 21 (describing the historical development for the conditions required to appoint 
an independent counsel). 
237 See id. at 30 (stating that the conditions and procedures set forth in the act are designed 
to give an Attorney General discretion to screen matters that do not require investigation by 
an independent counsel). 
238 Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 
1167, 1168 and citing Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978: 
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgt. of the Sen. Comm. on Governmental 
Affs., 97th Cong. 1-3 (1981) (statement of Sen. Cohen); see also Priester et al., supra note 
28, at 8. (“Can the Attorney General and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) be trusted to 
investigate and prosecute criminal wrongdoing by the President or persons close to him? The 
Act demonstrates that our political leaders have concluded that the answer is ‘no.’”). 
239 CONG. REC. S13,329 (1977). 
240 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988). 
241JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43112, INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, SPECIAL 
PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 2 (2013). 
242 Id. at 3. 
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Whitewater.243 In 2016, Representative Michael Turner (R–OH) introduced 
the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 2016 to reauthorize the 
Ethics in Government Act for a five-year period.244 Importantly, the 
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act would have expressly authorized 
investigations of the President himself. However, the bill was abandoned.245 
Because the Ethics in Government Act expired, the Department of 
Justice on July 9, 1999 issued replacement regulations for appointing a 
special counsel.246 “The regulations set forth a three-part analysis for 
determining whether to appoint a special counsel.”247 First, the Attorney 
General must determine that “criminal investigation of a person or matter is 
warranted.”248 Second, he or she must determine whether investigation or 
prosecution of the person or matter by a U.S. Attorney’s Office or a Justice 
Department litigating division would present either “a conflict of interest for 
the Department” or “other extraordinary circumstances.”249 Finally, the 
Attorney General must determine whether “it would be in the public interest 
to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the 
matter.”250 
One criticism of the regulatory special counsel oversight mechanisms 
is that investigations tend to languish and sometimes bore into issues that are 
beyond the scope of their original purpose.251 Jurisdictional boundaries of 
investigations are supposed to be set by the Attorney General, who may grant 
“original” jurisdiction to the special counsel, and who may expand that 




243 Id. (“It is possible, in theory, that Congress could reauthorize the independent counsel 
law, or provisions of law somewhat similar to the former independent counsel law, to instruct 
the Attorney General to seek the appointment of an ‘independent counsel’ under certain 
circumstances.”). 
244 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, H.R. 5271, 114th Cong. (2016). 
245 See CONG. RSCH. SERV. SUMMARY: H.R. 5271—114TH CONGRESS (2015–2016), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5271?r=2&s=1 [perma.cc/N2WT-
9LUB] (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) (maintaining a bill tracker that indicates no action has been 
taken by Congress since the initial introduction of H.R. 5271). 
246 See 28 C.F.R. Part 600. 
247 Special Counsel Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com. and Admin. L. of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 55 (1999) (Prepared Testimony of Dick 
Thornburgh, Mark H. Tuohey III & Michael Davidson). A reprinting of the testimony is 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/attorney-generals-special-counsel-
regulations/ [perma.cc/26WU-QFPU]. 
248 28 C.F.R. § 600.1. 
249 Id. § 600.1(a). 
250 Id. § 600.1(b). 
251 Thornburgh et al., supra note 247. 
252 28 C.F.R. § 600.4. 




the judgment of DOJ, and not necessarily a political entity. Regardless, 
experts from all ends of the political spectrum have criticized the scope of 
independent and special counsel investigations, including Democrats’ 
criticism of the sprawling Whitewater investigation253 and Republicans’ 
criticism of Robert Mueller’s “Russiagate” inquiry.254 
 
III.  THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
 
From the onset of Donald Trump’s presidency in 2017, his 
administration pushed the limits of presidential power. With a Republican 
majority in the Senate backing them, subordinate officials within his 
administration—including Attorney General William Barr, and personal 
attorneys Jay Sekulow and Rudy Giuliani—articulated legal arguments 
supporting President Trump’s assertions of broad executive authority and 
overall immunity from oversight. More than any other president in 
contemporary history, Trump articulated a conception of potentially 
unlimited presidential power. In the aftermath, Congress must step in to act 
again. 
 
A. Ukraine Impoundment Scandal 
 
In advancing his vision of presidential power, President Trump tested 
many of the post-Watergate oversight laws. For example, the Impoundment 
Control Act was central to Congress’s 2019–2020 impeachment inquiry and 
trial. In the summer of 2019, President Trump ordered OMB to impound 
money Congress had appropriated to the Department of Defense to Ukraine 
as military aid.255 In the special message delivered to Congress, OMB stated 
it had withheld the funds “to allow for an interagency process to determine 
the best use of such funds.”256  
 
253 See David A. Graham, From Whitewater to Benghazi: A Clinton-Scandal Primer, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/tracking-
the-clinton-controversies-from-whitewater-to-benghazi/396182/ [perma.cc/WEV6-Y9RG] 
(“The canonical case is Whitewater, a failed real-estate investment Bill and Hillary Clinton 
made in 1978. Although no inquiry ever produced evidence of wrongdoing, investigations 
ultimately led to President Clinton’s impeachment for perjury and obstruction of justice.”). 
254 See Deroy Murdock, Mueller Sticks the Final Shiv in Russiagate, NAT’L REV. (July 26, 
2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/mueller-sticks-the-final-shiv-in-the-russia 
gate-hoax/ [perma.cc/J2GP-Z3DX] (“[T]he substance of Mueller’s statements shot holes into 
his own report, like Al Capone emptying a machine gun.”). 
255 See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157, at 1. 
256 Id. at 4. 
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The Government Accountability Office determined that Trump’s 
action violated the ICA257 because the reason for the impoundment, “to 
determine the best use of such funds,” squarely prioritized Trump’s 
preferences over those of Congress, and the impoundment was not approved 
as a rescission or deferral.258 This was the clearest example since Nixon’s 
impoundment of federal water pollution control funds of a president 
challenging Congress’s spending power and policy judgment—the exact 
thing Congress intended to prevent by passing the ICA.259  
In response to the investigations, the House of Representatives 
ultimately submitted articles of impeachment to the Senate. However, the 
Senate acquitted Trump.260 Additionally, there have been no repercussions 
for OMB resulting from the incident. 
 
B. Special Counsel Investigation 
 
Prior to the Ukraine impoundment and impeachment proceedings, the 
Trump administration had already faced investigations over alleged 
wrongdoings. The most prominent, sometimes referred to as the “Russiagate” 
or “Mueller” probe, was an investigation initiated by the Department of 
Justice in response to allegations that President Trump’s campaign violated 
federal law by collaborating with Russian agents to undermine the integrity 
of the 2016 Presidential election. The investigation was led by Robert 
Mueller, a special counsel appointed under DOJ regulations. The 
investigation revealed lingering weaknesses in the special counsel 
mechanism as it currently exists. 
 
257 Olivia Beavers & Rebecca Klar, GAO Finds Trump Administration Broke Law by 
Withholding Aid, THE HILL (Jan. 16, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/ 
478557-gao-finds-trump-administration-broke-law-by-withholding-aid-from [perma.cc/ 
X2X3-V68Q]. 
258 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158, at 1. (“Faithful execution of the law 
does not permit the President to substitute his own policy priorities for those that Congress 
has enacted into law. OMB withheld funds for a policy reason, which is not permitted under 
the Impoundment Control Act . . . . Therefore, we conclude that OMB violated the ICA.”). 
259 In some ways, it is difficult to assess whether Trump’s actions were more egregious than 
Nixon’s impoundment of the water pollution control funds. Trump’s actions were clearly 
motivated by his political interests (impugning his opponents, in particular his rival for the 
presidency, Joe Biden). In contrast, Nixon’s impoundments were largely an effort to enforce 
policy preferences in ways that circumnavigated constitutional checks on executive powers. 
Thus, while Trump’s decision seems appallingly partisan to many commentators, arguably 
it is not as clear an affront to the power of Congress as Nixon’s decision to defy a law passed 
over his own veto. 
260 Nicholas Fandos, Trump Acquitted of Two Impeachment Charges in Near Party-Line 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/trump-
acquitted-impeachment.html [perma.cc/66CW-NLUS]. 




The investigation began in May 2017 and Mueller submitted his final 
report to Congress in March 2019.261 Despite no formal charges being 
recommended against the President, conservatives were widely upset with 
how the investigation was conducted. Echoing critics of prior investigations, 
including Ken Starr’s probe into Bill Clinton’s extramarital affair, 
Republicans criticized Mueller for wading into issues beyond his original 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on an expansive theory of Executive power, 
a line of critiques has gone so far as to challenge the idea of a special counsel 
as unconstitutional. These critics argue “[u]nder the Constitution, it is beyond 
the power of Congress to limit or impose conditions on any president’s 
authority to remove a political appointee within the Justice Department or 
any other department in the executive branch.”262 By this logic, special 
counsels may be removed because they are a wholly subordinate officer of 
the Executive, and therefore the Legislative branch of government has no 
authority to dictate when or for what reason the counsel may be fired.263  
This argument came only from Trump’s most ardent supporters, and 
as noted previously, it is squarely undermined by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison v. Olson,264 which upheld the Ethics in Government Act 
against a separation of powers challenge. A law passed by a coordinate 
branch of constitutional government—versus an enforcement arm 
answerable to the president—is surely a more legally sound means of 
 
261 ROBERT S. MUELLER III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION  (2019), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download [perma.cc/5KUN-ZYPX]   
[hereinafter MUELLER REPORT]. 
262 Hans A. von Spakovsky, Trump has the Constitutional Authority to Fire Mueller—Here’s 
Why, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/com 
mentary/trump-has-the-constitutional-authority-fire-mueller-heres-why [perma.cc/5KUN-
ZYPX]. 
263 See id. (“Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the president is given the authority 
to appoint . . . “Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” Congress is also allowed, by law, to “vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” . . . All of these officials—with the 
exception of judges and certain other officers (for example, the heads of federal agencies 
such as the Federal Election Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission) 
serve at the pleasure of the president. That means they can be removed by the president for 
any reason or no reason. The fact that a Cabinet official may appoint political subordinates—
such as a special counsel—does not take away the authority of the president to remove those 
subordinates.”). 
264 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60 (“This case presents us with a challenge to the 
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C §§ 49, 
591 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. V). We hold today that these provisions of the Act do not violate 
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, or the limitations of Article 
III, nor do they impermissibly interfere with the President’s authority under Article II in 
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.”). 
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establishing a special counsel apparatus than a policy created by DOJ. There 
have been attempts by lawmakers to strengthen, rather than undermine, the 
special counsel oversight mechanism—which at present is purely regulatory, 
not statutory—but those bills have gone nowhere.  
For example, Rep. Michael Turner introduced the Independent 
Counsel Reauthorization Act in 2016 to renew the expired provisions of the 
Ethics in Government Act related to independent counsels.265 The bill also 
would have expressly authorized the investigation of a sitting President.266 
Furthermore, in 2017, Republican Senator Thom Tillis introduced the Special 
Counsel Integrity Act. 267 Under this bill, only the Attorney General could 
discipline or remove a special counsel. The bill further provides that a special 
counsel can be removed only for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, 
conflict of interest, or other good cause.” The special counsel would have had 
to be notified in writing of the “specific reason” for his removal, and the 
special counsel would have been given the right to file a lawsuit contesting 
removal. However, this bill was abandoned in 2018.  
 
C. Alleged FISA Abuses 
 
The Mueller probe of Russian influence in the 2016 presidential 
election was facilitated by FISA, under which the FBI and Robert Mueller 
obtained warrants to surveil foreign agents suspected of illegally 
collaborating with the Trump campaign. Through FISA warrants, DOJ 
investigators uncovered a trove of information regarding improper contacts 
between Trump officials and Russian-affiliated agents.268 
Indeed, FISA was a central point of tension over the investigation 
between Trump administration supporters and opponents even before the 
special counsel was appointed. 269 Trump supporters alleged that, prior to the 
2016 election, the FBI improperly obtained FISA warrants to spy on 
campaign officials, and that the DOJ’s pre-election investigation into 
President Trump’s campaign was a politically motivated “hit-job” spurred by 
partisans within DOJ.270  
 
265 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, H.R. 5271, 114th  Cong. (2016). 
266 Id. 
267 Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. (2017). 
268 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 261, at 13, 183. 
269 Myths and Facts on Russia Inquiry Origins, CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS IN WASH., 
https://www.citizensforethics.org/myths-and-facts-russia-inquiry-origins/ [perma.cc/P722-
5LT6] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (“FBI FISA applications on former Trump campaign 
advisor Carter Page are evidence of a political conspiracy against the Trump campaign.”). 
270 See, e.g., John Malcom, The Facts Currently Known About Nunes Memo, FBI Bias 
Accusations, HERITAGE FOUND.: COMMENTARY (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/ 
crime-and-justice/commentary/the-facts-currently-known-about-nunes-memo-fbi-bias-
accusations [perma.cc/KDA5-B9P6]. 




In early 2018, in response to Republican criticism, the DOJ Inspector 
General conducted investigations into DOJ abuse of FISA warrant 
applications.271 The Department of Justice allowed the IG “extraordinary” to 
the FISA warrant applications filed in relation to the 2016 Russia-Trump 
investigation.272 The investigation resulted in the discovery of texts between 
two FBI agents273 that indicated they held political views adverse to the 
President, and that they appeared to desire to incriminate him through the 
investigation.274  
The IG did not conclude that any laws or internal policies had been 
broken, but did recommend changes to the FBI’s and the DOJ’s data retention 
policies to ensure similar issues could be investigated more easily in the 
future.275 The relevance of these findings are disputed by partisans on both 
sides. According to Senator John Cornyn, “the inspector general detailed a 
number of truly disturbing and alarming facts about how this investigation 
was conducted, especially when it comes to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, otherwise known as FISA.”276 However, other 
commentators have contested that the investigation did not turn up anything 
of great substance.277 
In response to the tension surrounding the Russia investigation, 
Republicans introduced the Inspector General Access Act.278 This Act would 
grant the Inspector General of the Department of Justice authority to 
investigate DOJ prosecutors when those prosecutors are suspected of 
 
271 165 CONG. REC. 204 (2019) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) [hereinafter Cornyn]. It 
should be noted here that this investigation may have been related to the introduction by four 
Republican Senators of the “Inspector General Access Act,” which is discussed in the 
“Inspector General Act of 1978” section of this document, infra note 278 and accompanying 
text. The Inspector General is currently precluded from investigating allegations of 
misconduct by DOJ prosecutors, but not FBI agents. Therefore, the Inspector General’s 
inquiry into abuse of FISA warrants was limited solely to FBI agents who were involved. 
The Inspector General Access Act would allow prosecutors to be investigated as well. 
272 Josh Delk, DOJ Agrees to Allow ‘Extraordinary’ Access to FISA Applications, THE HILL 
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/382056-doj-offers-extraordinary-accom 
modation-allowing-intel-committee-access-to-fisa [perma.cc/X76B-PL73]. 
273 The two agents were Peter Strzok and Lisa Page, FBI agents who were involved in the 
2016 inquiry into the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russia. 
274 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: 
RECOVERY OF TEXT MESSAGES FROM CERTAIN FBI MOBILE DEVICES 8 (2018), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/i-2018-003523.pdf [perma.cc/2UWQ-FL2Y]. 
275 Id. at 11. 
276 Cornyn, supra note 271. 
277 Devlin Barrett, Matt Zapotosky, Karoun Demirjian & Ellen Nakashima, FBI was Justified 
in Opening Trump Campaign Probe, but Case Plagued by Serious Failures, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/inspector-general-rep 
ort-trump-russia-investigation/2019/12/09/d5940d88-184c-11ea-a659-7d69641c6ff7_story. 
html [perma.cc/BG28-ZAX9]. 
278 Inspector General Access Act of 2019, H.R. 202, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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wrongdoing.279 Theoretically, this would ensure that DOJ prosecutors face 
consequences if they abuse the FISA process to obtain politically motivated 
warrants, as Republicans argued was the case with the 2016 investigation. To 
date, the legislation has not passed, but Senator Dick Durbin has introduced 
a revised 2021 version of the bill that is currently moving through the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.280 
 
D. Intimidation of Inspectors General 
 
After his first impeachment trial, President Trump appeared 
emboldened to flex his power by flouting other post-Watergate reforms in 
increasingly aggressive ways. For example, between April 3 and May 15, 
2020, the administration dismissed five Inspectors General in what the 
Washington Post declared a “slow-motion Friday night massacre.”281 Those 
IGs were: Michael Atkinson, IG for the Intelligence Community; Christi 
Grimm, Acting IG for the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS); 
Steve Linick, IG for the Department of State; Glenn Fine, Acting IG for the 
Department of Defense, and Mitch Behm, Acting IG for the Department of 
Transportation.282 
Despite the obvious way these firings undermined the independence 
of IGs, there is little in the Inspector General Act (IGA) that practically 
prevents a politically motivated reprisal. The IGA allows the President to 
remove an IG so long as the President appropriately reports the removal to 
Congress “not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”283 
The limits of the President’s removal power have not been clearly 
defined, and at least one Obama era case highlights this problem, Walpin v. 
Corporation for National & Community Service.284 In 2009, President 
Obama fired Gerald Walpin, the Inspector General for the Corporation for 
 
279 Id. 
280 Inspector General Access Act of 2021, S. 426, 117th Cong. (2021). 
281 Aaron Blake, Trump’s Slow-Motion Friday Night Massacre of Inspectors General, 
WASH. POST, (May 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/16/ 
trumps-slow-moving-friday-night-massacre-inspectors-general/ [perma.cc/Y69U-Y6D5]. 
The period was characterized by a pattern of the administration announcing departures on 
Friday evenings, prompting accusations that the administration was attempting to hide the 
moves from public scrutiny. See id. (“The Friday news dump—also known as the 
Friday night news dump—is a political trick with plenty of precedent. Wait till the vast 
majority of the news business clocks out for on the week and announce something you’d 
rather they not cover as much.”). 
282 Id. 
283 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 3(b). 
284 718 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. June 17, 2018). 




National and Community Service (CNCS).285 The reason Obama provided to 
Congress for the firing was the President no longer had “the fullest 
confidence in” Walpin.286 Walpin sued the Obama administration, claiming 
the firing was intended to stifle Walpin’s investigation into former NBA 
player and Mayor of Sacramento Kevin Johnson, a high-profile supporter of 
Obama.287 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed the suit.288 The court stated that the requirement in the statute that 
the President give Congress his reasons for removal was too vague for the 
courts to assess whether Obama’s claim that he had lost confidence in Walpin 
was sufficient to support the removal.289  
Furthermore, like an independent counsel under the Ethics in 
Government Act, IGs are officers within the Executive branch, and therefore 
the ability of Congress to enforce IG independence measures is somewhat 
limited. Though the precise extent to which Congress can impose “for-cause 
removal protections” is not yet clear, two cases—Morrison v. Olson290 and 
Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau291—provide some 
guidance. Both explore the constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to 
provide for-cause removal protections to insulate agency officials from 
executive pressure. As explained above, Morrison affirmed the 
constitutionality of the statutory independent counsel mechanism with 
respect to appointment,292 concluding that the Attorney General can be vested 
with exclusive authority to appoint an independent counsel. That case was 
refined by Seila Law, which challenged the constitutionality of the removal 
protections provided to the director of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB)—an independent official protected by for-cause removal in 
 
285 See id. at 19–20 (explaining that President Obama’s special counsel requested Walpin’s 
resignation and had him placed on administrative leave before informing both Houses of 
Congress that he was “exercising [his] power as President to remove [Mr. Walpin] from 
office . . .”). 
286 Id. at 20. 
287 Josh Gerstein, Former Watchdog Walpin Loses Suit Over Firing, POLITICO (June 18, 
2010), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2010/06/former-watchdog-walpin-
loses-suit-over-firing-027625 [perma.cc/FPE9-E636]. 
288 Walpin, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
289 See id. at 22–24 (“While Walpin complains that the President’s rationale was insufficient, 
Walpin fails to show how the IGRA provides any sort of criteria that would allow a court to 
make that determination.”). 
290 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663 (1998). 
291 Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191–92 (2020). 
292 487 U.S. at 675–76 (“We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to provide for 
interbranch appointments of ‘inferior officers’ is unlimited . . . . In this case, however, we do 
not think it impermissible for Congress to vest the power to appoint independent counsel in 
a specially created federal court. We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
that there is an inherent incongruity about a court having the power to appoint prosecutorial 
officers.”). 
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a way similar to independent counsels.293 The Supreme Court held that the 
for-cause removal protections ascribed to the CFPB director were 
unconstitutional because the act vested an official other than the President 
with authority to execute the laws of Congress, and in doing so stole power 
assigned by the Constitution to the Executive.294 
The constitutionality of inspectors general per se has not reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In light of Morrison, however, the current law suggests 
that some limits on the President’s ability to fire an IG are legal, particularly 
given the inclusion of statutory language and evidence of legislative intent 
indicating a desire by Congress to create an office independent from the 
Executive. The IGA says: “Neither the head of the establishment nor the 
officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector 
General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or 
investigation.”295  
What follows is a discussion of each of the firings that took place 
under President Trump from April 3rd to May 15th, 2020. 
 
1. Inspector General of National Intelligence 
 
The afternoon of Friday, April 3, 2020, President Trump fired 
Michael Atkinson, the IG of the Intelligence Community.296 In his message 
to Congress, he claimed he had lost confidence in Atkinson,297 in language 
that was similar to that used by President Obama when he dismissed the IG 
 
293 140 S. Ct. at 2191–92. 
294 Id. at 2192 (“We therefore hold that the structure of the CFPB violates the separation of 
powers. We go on to hold that the CFPB Director's removal protection is severable from the 
other statutory provisions bearing on the CFPB's authority. The agency may therefore 
continue to operate, but its Director, in light of our decision, must be removable by the 
President at will.”). Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 492–95 (2010) (leaving in place two exceptions to the President's unrestricted removal 
power representing the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional 
restriction on the removal power: (1) multimember expert agencies that do not 
wield substantial executive power and (2) inferior officers with limited duties and no 
policymaking or administrative authority). 
295 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 3(a). 
296 Natasha Bertrand & Andrew Desiderio, Trump Fires Intelligence Community Watchdog 
Who Defied Him on Whistleblower Complaint, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/03/trump-fires-intelligence-community-inspector-
general-164287 [perma.cc/ZHH4-UA5F]. 
297 Letter from President Donald Trump to Richard Burr, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 3, 2020) (“As is the case with regard to other positions 
where I, the President, have the power of appointment, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, it is vital that I have the fullest confidence in the appointees serving as 
Inspectors General. That is no longer the case with regard to [Michael Atkinson].”). 




of CNCS. However, Trump publicly disclosed that Atkinson was fired 
because he investigated a whistleblower complaint.298 The complaint alleged 
the President had improperly impounded Department of Defense foreign 
military aid to Ukraine, and conditioned release on Ukraine’s announcement 
of a corruption investigation into the President’s political rival, Joe Biden.299  
Following his firing, Atkinson released a defiant statement urging his 
fellow IGs throughout the federal government to continue to fulfill their 
oversight duties and encouraging whistleblowers to continue to report 
wrongdoing.300 As Atkinson noted in his statement, his firing is likely to have 
a chilling effect on inspectors general throughout the federal system.  
The firing of Atkinson probably cannot be classified as a prohibition 
against the investigation he carried out. Instead, it was a retaliation for his 
decision to initiate the investigation. This retaliatory measure did not prevent 
Atkinson’s investigation, but it did send a chilling message to IGs at other 
agencies. That message: Do not initiate investigations that will embarrass the 
administration.301 This incident made clear that protections of independence 
 
298 Andrew Desiderio, Trump Defends Firing ‘Terrible’ Intel Community Watchdog as 
Republicans Question Sacking, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/ 
2020/04/04/chuck-grassley-intel-community-watchdog-firing-164831 [perma.cc/Z48D- 
SC82] 
299 Jonathan Landay, “Republicans Want Hunter Biden, Whistleblower to Testify in Open 
Hearings,” REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-impeach 
ment/republicans-want-hunter-biden-whistleblower-to-testify-in-open-hearings-idUSKBN 
1XJ0FK [perma.cc/5RZK-NVX7]. 
300 See Statement of Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
on His Removal from Office (Apr. 5, 2020), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/document 
helper/6865-atkinson-statement-on-removal/339e56bc31e7c607c4b9/optimized/full.pdf 
#page=1 [perma.cc/FSG6-C8VR] (“Finally, a message for any government employee or 
contractor who believes they have learned of or observed unethical, wasteful, or illegal 
behavior in the federal government. The American people deserve an honest and effective 
government. They are counting on you to use authorized channels to bravely speak up . . . I 
have faith that my colleagues in Inspectors General Offices throughout the federal 
government will continue to operate effective and independent whistleblower programs, and 
that they will continue to do everything in their power to protect the rights of whistleblowers. 
Please do not allow recent events to silence your voices.”) 
301 In the wake of Atkinson’s firing, the President practically declared open season on 
Inspectors General who carry out their statutory duties. See Trump Attacks W.H.O. and Ousts 
Watchdog for Pandemic Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/04/07/world/coronavirus-updates-news-live.html [perma.cc/XGQ9-4SSK] (discussing 
Trump’s public rebukes of various Inspectors General throughout the government); Brianna 
Ehley & Alice Miranda Ollstein, Trump Blasts HHS Watchdog for Report on Hospital 
Shortages, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/06/with-
worst-to-come-3-in-4-us-hospitals-now-facing-covid-19-167853 [perma.cc/JP6W-Y65R] 
(“President Donald Trump on Monday blasted his health department's watchdog for a new 
report revealing supply shortages and testing delays at hospitals responding to the 
coronavirus crisis, claiming the findings were inaccurate and politically motivated.”); 
 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
80 
pre-investigation are not sufficient to allow IGs to do their job and additional 
protections are needed to ensure that IGs can carry out their missions without 
fear of reprisal. 
An additional weakness in the Act is the inability of the IG of the 
Department of Justice to investigate misconduct by DOJ attorneys, which 
prevented the IG from initiating an investigation into alleged abuse of the 
FISA system in 2016.302 This prohibition led to the introduction of H.R. 202, 
the Inspector General Access Act of 2019, discussed briefly in section C, 
supra.303 This bill would “transfer[] responsibility for investigating certain 
allegations of misconduct from the [DOJ] Office of Professional 
Responsibility to the DOJ Office of the Inspector General. Specifically, the 
bill transfers responsibility for allegations relating to a DOJ attorney’s 
authority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.”304 The bill was 
introduced by Senator Mike Lee.305 According to Lee, “The Inspector 
General Access Act solves the problems that have long plagued oversight of  
 
Stephen M. Kohn, How Firing Inspector General Atkinson Impacts the Government’s Ability 
to Fight Coronavirus, THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2020), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/politics/491284-how-the-firing-inspector-general-atkinson-impacts-the 
[perma.cc/69QK-QD9Y] (discussing the pressure put on the Navy’s IG not to open an 
investigation into firings of sailors who raise concerns regarding COVID-19 aboard their 
ships). 
302 See Allie Gottlieb, Current Law Helps Shield Attorney General From Independent 
Review, REG. REV. (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/03/03/gottlieb-
current-law-helps-shield-attorney-general-independent-review/ [perma.cc/3HRY-2JD7] 
(summarizing the law that requires the DOJ IG to defer to the Attorney General’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility on all investigations of DOJ attorney misconduct). 
303 Inspector General Access Act of 2019, supra note 278.  
304 See CONG. RSCH. SERV. SUMMARY: H.R. 202—116TH CONGRESS (2019–2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/202/summary/ [perma.cc/2MDG-
37SF]. 
305 The bill was introduced by four Republican Senators. Id. However, it also received 
support from traditionally liberal groups, such as the ACLU. See Letter from ACLU to Sens. 
Mike Lee, Marsha Blackburn, Charles Grassley, Lisa Murkowski & Marco Rubio, ACLU 
(Oct. 16, 2019), available at https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-ig-access-act 
[perma.cc/3LUZ-9YDP] [hereinafter ACLU Letter] (“The Inspector General Access Act is 
commonsense legislation that would make a simple yet vital revision to the Inspector General 
Act of 1978 that we believe will enhance the accountability of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) by allowing the DOJ inspector general to investigate allegations of misconduct by 
federal attorneys. . . . Under current policy and practice, alleged professional wrongdoing or 
other issues relating to professional misconduct by DOJ attorneys are handled by an internal 
and non-independent entity, the Office of Professional Responsibility.”). 




DOJ lawyers by simply striking the jurisdictional carve out in § 8E of the 
Inspector General Act.”306 This would remove barriers preventing DOJ’s IG 
from investigating allegations of misconduct against DOJ attorneys. 307 
Given former Attorney General William Barr’s attempts to politicize 
the DOJ, the Inspector General Access Act would arguably create a necessary 
safeguard to protect the integrity of the institution.308 It would make it 
possible to determine whether investigations initiated by a presidential 
administration are being carried out for proper purposes, such as to prevent 
corruption, and not merely to smear political opponents. The bill received 
support from politicians and advocacy groups across the political spectrum. 
For example, a coalition of civil liberties groups, including the ACLU, 
expressed support for the bill in a letter to Senator Lee, a Republican.309 
According to an ACLU press release, the organization’s support is grounded 
in concerns over transparency.310 The legislation was intended to promote 
accountability, transparency, and integrity in the Department of Justice by 
allowing the Inspector General to exercise jurisdiction over attorneys just as 
would be exercised over other DOJ employees.311 
 
2. Principal Deputy Inspector General of Health & Human Services 
 
On May 2, 2020, Trump replaced Acting IG Christi Grimm at the 
Department of Health & Human Services.312 This was in response to 
Grimm’s report that hospitals were experiencing “severe shortages” in 
 
306 Press Release, Sen. Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Grassley, Murkowski, Blackburn, and Rubio 
Introduce Inspector General Access Act, (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm/2019/3/sens-lee-grassley-murkowski-blackburn-and-rubio-introduce-inspector-
general-access-act. [perma.cc/8WL6-3LVP]. 
307 See id. (“[T]he Department of Justice OIG currently does not have the power to review 
the conduct of DOJ attorneys, an oversight which this legislation corrects.”). 
308 Barr’s efforts to use the massive investigatory apparatus of the Justice Department to cast 
suspicion on political opponents was well documented. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Matt 
Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, Barr’s Internal Reviews and Re-Investigations Feed Resentment, 
Suspicion Inside Justice Dept., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020) (“The Justice Department in the 
Trump era has repeatedly tasked U.S. attorneys from far-flung offices to parachute into 
politically explosive cases in Washington, raising concerns among current and former 
officials that agency leaders are trying to please the president by reviewing and 
reinvestigating cases in which he is personally or politically invested.”). 
309 ACLU Letter, supra note 305. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id.; Lisa Rein, Trump Replaces HHS Watchdog Who Found ‘Severe Shortages’ at 
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critical resources such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and intensive 
care unit (ICU) capacity because of COVID-19.313 This firing was especially 
concerning given the vast scope of the public health and economic responses 
triggered by the pandemic, which has already involved trillions in federal 
response funding, all of which needs to be overseen by a financial watchdog. 
In response to the pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act, a $2 trillion 
economic relief bill.314 The Act contains three mechanisms for oversight 
regarding how the money is spent.315 First, it created the Pandemic Response 
Accountability Committee, a panel of IGs tasked with general oversight of 
the law’s administration.316 Second, it created the Special Inspector General 
for Pandemic Recovery, who is assigned to oversee the Treasury 
Department’s distribution of money for large corporations.317 Finally, it 
created a bi-partisan, bicameral Congressional Oversight Commission to 
oversee the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve.318 
The timing of the enactment of the CARES Act coincided with 
Trump’s campaign of intimidation against federal IGs. To this day, the need 
for effective oversight of CARES Act funding remains urgent, as indicated 
by the findings of a House panel that HHS overpaid for ventilators by as much 
as $500 million.319 The same deal allowed the contractor to delay production 
of the ventilators until September 2022, despite a present need for them.320 
Furthermore, IGs across the federal government felt intimidated under 
Trump. If the precedent lingers that IGs may be unable to do their jobs 
without fear of retaliation, the oversight provisions in the CARES Act are 
 
313 CHRISTI A. GRIMM, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., OEI-
06-20-00300, HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS 
OF A NATIONAL PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020, at 1 (2020), available at 
https://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf [perma.cc/X28Z-52Y3]; Rein, 
supra note 312. 
314 See Jackson Gode, Congressional Oversight of the CARES Act Could Prove 
Troublesome, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/ 
2020/04/15/congressional-oversight-of-the-cares-act-could-prove-troublesome/ 
[perma.cc/F5KZ-3P3G] (“President Trump signed the CARES Act providing for more than 
$2 Trillion in federal spending in response to the COVID-19 crisis.”). 
315 Id. 
316 Id. The panel is composed of a minimum of nine IGs. Currently, the panel is comprised 
of 22 IGs. PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., About the PRAC, 
https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/our-mission/about-the-prac [perma.cc/XU8M-DZC3] 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2021). 
317 Gode, supra note 314. 
318 Id. 
319 Patricia Callahan & Sebastian Rotella, The White House Paid Up to $500 Million Too 








rendered pointless. Grimm highlighted these very concerns upon her ousting, 
stating “I cannot let the idea of providing unpopular information drive 
decision-making in the work we do.”321 Like Atkinson, she stressed that 
independence is “the cornerstone of what any office of inspector general 
does.”322 
 
3. Inspectors General of the State Department 
 
Under President Trump, the Inspector General for the State 
Department was replaced twice. First, Steve Linick was replaced as a part of 
the “slow-moving Saturday Night Massacre.”323 Second, his replacement, a 
political appointee named Stephen Akard, resigned for undisclosed 
reasons.324 Though the reason for Akard’s resignation was unclear, the 
circumstances around his appointment were controversial.325 Akard replaced 
Linick in response to pressure on President Trump from Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo, whom Linick was investigating for his involvement in a 2019 
arms sale to Saudi Arabia that was completed without Congressional 
approval.326  
Despite this tumult, the State Department’s OIG was busy. In August 
2020, it published a report titled “Review of the Department of State’s Role 
in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
 
321 Amy Goldstein, Top HHS Watchdog Being Replaced by Trump Says Inspectors General 





323 Aaron Blake, Trump’s Slow-Motion Friday Night Massacre of Inspectors General, 
WASH. POST, (May 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/16/ 
trumps-slow-moving-friday-night-massacre-inspectors-general/ [perma.cc/Y69U-Y6D5]; 
see also Michele Kelemen, Trump Removes State Department Inspector General Steve 
Linkick, NPR (May 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/16/857334790/president-
trump-removes-state-department-inspector-general-steve-linick [perma.cc/Y7XW-5CDX] 
(“President Trump is ousting State Department Inspector General Steve Linick, extending a 
string of administration firings of government watchdogs.”); Pranshu Verma & Edward 
Wong, Another Inspector General Resigns Amid Questions About Pompeo, N. Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/us/politics/inspector-general-
pompeo-state.html [perma.cc/QG8B-NZF3] (explaining that Stephen Akard, who replaced 
Steve Linick, resigned less than three months after his predecessor’s firing, and the 
resignation came as Congress continued to inquire about the reasons for Linick’s firing). 
324 See Matt Perez, Acting State Department Inspector General Resigns After Less Than 
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Emirates.”327 The report indicated that the Trump administration failed to 
adequately consider the humanitarian impact arms sales to Saudi Arabia 
would have in Yemen.328 In light of these concerning allegations, it remains 
important that stability and effective oversight in the State OIG are achieved. 
 
4. Acting Inspector General of the Department of Defense 
 
On April 7, 2020, President Trump replaced Glenn Fine, the Acting 
IG for the Department of Defense, just as he prepared to step into a new role 
as the chairman of the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee created 
under the CARES Act.329 While Trump never announced a retaliatory motive 
for replacing Fine, the New York Times reported that it may have been in 
response to the President’s perception that Fine was a “partisan foe.”330 This 
is most troubling because replacing Fine prevented Fine, a figure widely 
viewed as apolitical, from taking on a role overseeing the disbursement of the 
$2.2 trillion in pandemic relief money.331  Furthermore, Fine was replaced by 
 
327 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ISP-I-20-19, REVIEW OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S ROLE IN ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2020), available at https://www.stateoig.gov/system/ 
files/isp-i-20-19.pdf [perma.cc/975Q-HFVK]. 
328 Diane Bernabei & Beth Van Schaack, State Dept. Inspector General Report: A Troubling 
Message on Arms Sales, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
72188/state-dept-inspector-general-linick-saudi-arms-sales/ [perma.cc/Q5HE-2X5Z]. 
329 Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Trump Ousts Pandemic Spending Watchdog Known for 
Independence, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/pol 
itics/trump-coronavirus-watchdog-glenn-fine.html [perma.cc/E88E-NX3T] (“President 
Trump moved on Tuesday to oust the leader of a new watchdog panel charged with 
overseeing how his administration spends trillions of taxpayer dollars in 
coronavirus pandemic relief, the latest step in an abruptly unfolding White House power play 
against semi-independent inspectors general across the government. The official, Glenn A. 
Fine, has been the acting inspector general for the Defense Department since before 
Mr. Trump took office and was set to become the chairman of a new Pandemic Response 
Accountability Committee to police how the government carries out the $2.2 trillion 
coronavirus relief bill. But Mr. Trump replaced Mr. Fine in his Pentagon job, disqualifying 
him from serving on the new oversight panel.”). 
330 Id. (“At his daily coronavirus briefing, Mr. Trump offered no particular explanation for 
sidelining Mr. Fine but characterized it as part of a larger shuffle of inspectors general, some 
of them left over from past administrations, and cited unspecified ‘reports of bias.’ . . . But 
Mr. Trump’s allies said he felt burned by the investigations of his campaign and associates 
and therefore distrusts figures he perceives to be partisan foes within government . . . .”). 
331 Id. (“In removing Mr. Fine from his role overseeing pandemic spending, Mr. Trump 
targeted a former Justice Department inspector general who earned a reputation for 
aggressive independence in scrutinizing the F.B.I.’s use of surveillance and other law 
enforcement powers in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks . . . . A group of inspectors 
general led by Michael E. Horowitz, the Justice Department inspector general, will determine 
who will replace Mr. Fine as chairman of the new pandemic oversight committee. Created 
 




the IG for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who was not relieved 
of his duties at EPA.332 Trump thus split his nominee between the two 
agencies—ensuring lax oversight at both.333  
 
5. Acting Inspector General of the Department of Transportation 
 
Finally, Trump demoted the former Acting IG for the Department of 
Transportation, Mitch Behm, to deputy after a long vacancy,334 using the 
Vacancies Act to install a political appointee at the post instead.335 This 
replacement was notable for several reasons. First, it was another example of 
Trump removing an official who would oversee implementation of money 
distributed by the CARES Act. Second, the nomination was done in such a 
way that executive authority under the Vacancies Act may have been 
expanded. 
President Trump repeatedly used the Vacancies Act to replace career 
bureaucrats with political appointees across the federal government, 
including IGs.336 The Vacancies Act allows a President to appoint an acting 
official to temporarily fill a vacancy that would otherwise be filled by a 
Senate confirmed official.337 Normally, this appointment must occur within 
 
as part of the coronavirus relief bill, the committee consists of nine inspectors general from 
across the executive branch and will have an $80 million budget to hunt for waste, fraud, 
abuse and illegality in the disbursement of the $2.2 trillion approved by Congress to provide 
relief to Americans affected by the pandemic.”). 
332 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Watchdogs at Large, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 6, 2020), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/research/watchdogs-at-large/ [perma.cc/P6SE-HRB4] (“Only when the 
White House nominated Jason Abend to the position in early April could President Trump 
demote Fine. Abend’s nomination allowed the Vacancies Act to kick in again, which 
permitted the President to select Sean O’Donnell, the EPA’s confirmed IG, as the new acting 
IG for the Department of Defense. (Under the quirks of the Vacancies Act, O’Donnell 
maintains his official title and responsibilities as the EPA’s IG as well. Although he can 
delegate work to others, he is now stretched very thin.”). 
333 Id. 
334 Sam Mintz, Democrats Blast Removal of Acting DOT Inspector General, POLITICO 
(May 19, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/19/democrats-blast-removal-of-
acting-dot-inspector-general-268611 [perma.cc/5JY6-BK45] (“Behm, a longtime deputy 
inspector general who had been acting in the lead position since Calvin Scovell retired in 
January, was replaced Saturday by Skip Elliott, who is also administrator of the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.”). 
335 O’Connell, supra note 332 (“Like Akard, the new acting IG at Transportation is a political 
appointee.”). 
336 See id. (noting Trump’s use of the Vacancies Act to appoint Sean O’Donnell as Acting 
IG of the Department of Defense, Stephen Akard as Acting IG of the State Department, and 
Stephen Elliot as Acting IG of the Department of Transportation). 
337 VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE VACANCIES ACT: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 
3 (2020). 
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a set timeframe of 210 days.338 However, Trump appointed his replacement 
Acting IG for Transportation after that time limit had already expired.339 In 
doing so, Trump may have effectively expanded the timeframe further as a 
matter of precedent, thus allowing him more time in the future to delay 
selecting a temporary appointment, and providing additional opportunities to 
thwart potentially harmful internal investigations.340 
 
6. Inspector General of the Post Office 
 
One key agency involved in the 2020 election was the United States 
Postal Service (USPS), which received public scrutiny because of reported 
changes by the Trump administration. As allegations of politically motivated 
reforms emerged, it became increasingly vital that the IG ensure 
accountability and foster public trust in the USPS. Indeed, the IG of USPS 
announced in August 2020 that the office was opening an investigation into 
policy changes imposed under Postmaster General Louis DeJoy.341 This 
investigation was in response to a request from Congress.342 The 
investigation followed the resignation of two members of USPS’s Board of 
Governors over similar allegations of politicization of the agency.343 
 
E. Weaknesses in Federal Advisory Committee Act 
 
1. Open questions about the Trump White House’s Coronavirus 
Task Force 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic added urgency for Executive branch 
oversight in several additional ways. As discussed above, the need for a 
strong IG at HHS to oversee the distribution of CARES Act money became 
important, as well as the need to ensure other federal bodies overseeing the 
response to the pandemic are also accountable. In response to the pandemic, 
 
338 Id. at 13. 
339 O’Connell, supra note 332. 
340 See id. (“The President did not need to nominate someone to change the acting IG at the 
Transportation Department because the vacancy still fell within the Act’s time limits. 
President Trump extended those limits, however, when he did submit a nominee a month 
later.”). 
341 Marshall Cohen & Kristen Holmes, Exclusive: Postal Service Inspector General 




343 Alana Abramson, How the Postal Service Became Donald Trump’s for the Taking, TIME 
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://time.com/5882006/usps-board-governors-trump/ [perma.cc/Z7U6-
RTBV]. 




President Trump put his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, in charge of a “shadow” 
task force composed of federal officials and industry representatives. The 
goal of the task force was to help federal agencies address the nation’s acute 
shortage of tests to determine whether patients are infected with COVID-19.  
Ethics watchdogs sounded the alarm that the task force may have 
actually been a rogue advisory committee in violation of FACA.344 In a letter 
to the White House by Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington 
(CREW), the group stated, “Mr. Kushner’s use of a committee composed of 
federal employees and non-governmental members to solicit advice on how 
the White House should address the coronavirus pandemic implicates the 
FACA.” 345 According to CREW, the committee’s use of a private email 
server likely violated both FACA and the Presidential Records Act.346 CREW 
also expressed concern that the committee’s secret meetings violated 
FACA.347 Without access to meetings or emails, the public remains in the 
dark. These concerns should have raised congressional alarms, especially 
because President Trump and Jared Kushner stood to potentially benefit 
personally from the passage of stimulus bills related to COVID-19.348 If 
Trump, Kushner, and their associates were profiting off policies related to the 
crisis, it is likely that related FACA violations resulted in the very sort of 
corruption the Act was intended to prevent. However, given weaknesses in 
the enforceability of FACA that were outlined by the D.C. Circuit during the 
Bush administration, it is difficult to see what the practical consequences for 






344 See e.g., Press Release, Kushner’s Shadow Task Force Appears to Violate Multiple Laws, 
CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN WASH. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.citizensforethics. 
org/press-release/kushners-shadow-task-force-violate-multiple-laws/ [perma.cc/G6BS-
8NGV] (noting Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington letter raising alarms 
that Kushner’s task force violated the PRA and FACA). 
345 Letter from Noah Bookbinder, Executive Director, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. 
to Pat Cipollone, White House Counsel (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.citizensforethics.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/legacy/2020/03/2020-3-27-WH-Counsel-letter-PRA-FACA.pdf 
[perma.cc/B78W-B96J]. 
346 CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN WASH., supra note 344. 
347 Id. 
348 Jonathan Lemire & Stephen Braun, Virus Relief Package Could Help Trump, Kushner 
Businesses, AP (Mar. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-donald-trump-
politics-windfalls-business-cfd3e3fe42997a7f3dbcc5c9225a4851 [https://perma.cc/4PPG-
3GZH] (“The $2 trillion legislative package moving through Congress to shore up the U.S. 
economy devastated by the coronavirus was carefully written to prevent President Donald 
Trump and his family from profiting from the federal fund. But the fine print reveals that 
businesses owned by Trump and his family still may be eligible for some assistance.”). 
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2. NDRC’s FACA objection to Cheney Energy Task Force 
 
The George W. Bush administration pushed the limits of FACA, 
prompting the D.C. Circuit to clarify the scope of its enforceability.349 In 
2004, environmental and public interest groups sued the federal government 
under FACA and FOIA to obtain records related to an “energy task force” at 
the Department of the Interior, led by Vice President Cheney.350 The lawsuit 
was prompted by the agency’s failure to make public committee notes, 
correspondences between committee members and government employees, 
and conversations committee members had with private outside parties.351 
Importantly, NRDC alleged that representatives of energy industry groups 
improperly presented information to the task force.352  
Despite seeming not to comply with FACA’s basic requirements, the 
task force did not face formal sanctions of any sort.353 Instead, the D.C. 
Circuit held that although the spirit of FACA may have indeed been violated, 
it was beyond the authority of the judiciary to compel the information to be 
provided.354 This is because it is the role of the Executive, not the judiciary, 
to determine whether a private party is made part of an advisory committee 
by virtue of presenting information to it.355 In this instance, the Bush 
administration declared the private party was not a part of the task force, and 
therefore was exempt from FACAs requirements.356 
This decision raised an important weakness in FACA’s efficacy. If a 
court is unable to enforce FACA unless the Executive declares an advisory 
committee or individual members as subject to FACA, the Executive 
essentially has full authority to disregard the statute entirely. Thus, FACA 
 
349 No Openness Required for Cheney Energy Task Force, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS (May 12, 2005), https://www.rcfp.org/no-openness-required-cheney-energy-
task-force/ [perma.cc/76T9-QAWJ]. 
350 In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2005); See also Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court 
to Hear Cheney Energy Case, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 23, 2004), 
https://www.nrdc.org/media/2004/040423 [perma.cc/G2YV-B4WF] (“The fundamental 
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in the FACA lawsuit against Vice President Cheney 
and others is whether the public should have access through discovery to records of the 
energy task force to determine whether FACA was violated. Neither the district court nor the 
D.C. Circuit determined that the administration had violated FACA, but both held that the 
plaintiffs had the right to access the information that could prove such violations.”). 
351 See Letter from Sharon Buccino & Johanna Wald, Senior Att’ys, Nat. Resources Def. 
Council, to William Wolf, FOIA Appeals Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Interior (Apr. 11, 2002), 
(https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/taskforce-0411doi.pdf) [perma.cc/2XHD-8ZP9] 
(detailing the Agency’s failure to comply with FOIA requests). 
352 Id. 
353 REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 349. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. 
356 Id.; In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 728. 




must be broadened to include not only members of a committee, but also 
individuals who present information or provide advice to that committee. 
Doing so would remove the loophole identified by the D.C. Circuit in 2004 
by ensuring that, regardless of whether the Executive identifies particular 
individuals as “members” of a task force, they will be subject to FACA 
requirements simply by virtue of participating in a task force’s meetings. 
 
F. Campaign Finance Violations 
 
1. Dismantling the FEC 
 
Even before his first impeachment acquittal and the COVID 
pandemic, Trump had tested the boundaries of the post-Watergate oversight 
reforms in a number of ways. For example, early in his administration he 
effectively undermined the powers of the FEC by refusing to appoint a 
sufficient number of commissioners to enable the agency to take virtually any 
actions whatsoever.357 The Commission requires four presidentially 
appointed commissioners for a quorum, which is required to approve the 
opening of investigations.358 As long as a president does not appoint anyone 
else to the Commission, it is unable to investigate campaign finance 
violations. In the Trump era, this was particularly troubling because Trump 
appears to have potentially committed multiple campaign finance violations 
and facilitated widespread lies and disinformation about the legitimacy of Joe 
Biden’s win in November 2020. 
 
2. Possible FECA violations  
 
First, in the runup to the 2016 election, Trump received assistance 
from Russia-based hackers and Wikileaks in connection to his election when 
those foreign nationals hacked into Democratic National Committee servers 
and publicly dumped thousands of embarrassing emails regarding then-
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. If Trump’s campaign coordinated with 
those foreign nationals, their involvement could constitute an in-kind 
contribution from a foreign national. FECA and FEC regulations include a 
broad prohibition on foreign national activity in connection with elections in 
 
357 See Dave Levinthal, Prepare to be Shocked! Trump’s One Weird Trick to Avoid a 
Campaign Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 13, 2020), https://publicintegrity. 
org/politics/trump-fec-campaign-election-quorum-pascrell/ [perma.cc/5Z2V-AA5U] 
(“[T]he FEC didn’t have enough commissioners to take meaningful action. Republican Vice 
Chairman Matthew Petersen had resigned on Sept. 1, causing the 309-employee agency to 
slip below a minimum quorum of four commissioners needed to conduct high-level business, 
including approving investigations and penalizing scofflaws.”). 
358 Id. 
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the United States.359 In general, foreign nationals are prohibited from 
“making any contribution . . . in connection with any federal . . . election in 
the United States.”360 FEC regulations define a “contribution” broadly, 
including “anything of value made . . . for the purpose of influencing any 
election for Federal office.”361 A “foreign national” includes foreign 
governments, foreign citizens, foreign corporations, associations, or 
partnerships, or any other “foreign principal” as defined at 22 U.S.C. § 
611(b).362 The leaking of embarrassing opposing campaign emails arguably 
fell within the FEC’s broad definition of a “contribution.”363 Further, both 
Wikileaks and the hackers involved in the leaks were foreign nationals.364 
Therefore, if the Trump campaign was aware of the leaking operation, it 
likely violated FECA. 
Like his 2016 campaign, President Trump’s 2020 presidential 
campaign seemed prepared to commit additional campaign finance 
violations. For example, both the President and his family members appear 
to have profited off his re-election campaign.365 According to filings with the 
FEC, Trump’s 2020 campaign spent a considerable amount of money on 
 
359 See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a) (prohibiting contributions or attempts at electioneering from 
foreign nationals to political committees, parties, or in connection with an election); See 
generally 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (same). 
360Foreign Nationals, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (June 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/ 
updates/foreign-nationals/ [perma.cc/DY8J-AQKX]. 
361 Id. §§ 100.52(a), 100.54. 
362 Foreign Nationals, supra note 360.  
363 FEC Chairwoman Ellen Weintraub was among the most high-profile and authoritative 
experts to express this opinion. See Caroline Linton, FEC Chairwoman Tweets “It Is Illegal” 
to Accept Anything of Value From a Foreign National in U.S. Election, CBS NEWS (June 13, 
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fec-chairwoman-tweets-illegal-to-accept-anything-
of-value-from-foreign-national-in-us-election-2019-06-13/ [perma.cc/WY4A-P3DD] 
(noting tweet from Weintraub clarifying that it is illegal to receive “anything of value” from 
foreign nationals in connection with a U.S. election). 
364 Danny Yadron, Russian Government Hackers Steal DNC Files on Donald Trump, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jun. 14, 2016, 14:41 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2016/jun/14/russian-dnc-hack-donald-trump-files-us-election [https://perma.cc/2V5G-
86QX]. 
365 See, e.g., Katelyn Burns, Trump Campaign Groups Spent $1.7 Million at His Own 
Properties and Businesses Last Quarter, VOX (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2020/2/3/21120187/trump-fec-campaign-trump-organization [https://perma.cc/ 
DBD3-CG2M] (“President Donald Trump once bragged that if he ever ran for president, 
he’d be the first person to make money off it. According to his campaign’s filings with the 
Federal Election Commission, that prediction appears to be coming true.”). In total, the 
President’s campaign appears to have spent $194,247.57 on Trump businesses, while 
conservative leaning groups have spent an additional $1.7 million at them. See id. 




rentals at Trump hotels, restaurants, and other businesses.366  While such 
payments may not be violations of FECA per se, they are if the payments 
were above “fair market rate” for the goods or services rendered.367 An FEC 
investigation is needed to resolve that question of fact. 
Following the election, the nation was shocked by one of the most 
brazen examples of political intimidation in the nation’s history when 
President Trump pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensberger 
and Governor Brian Kemp to overturn the results of the Georgia presidential 
election.368 The incident came to a head when Raffensberger’s legal team 
leaked audio of a phone call in which Trump directly suggested 
Raffensberger “find” votes in his favor so as to overturn the election’s 
results.369 The incident is being investigated at a state level by the Fulton 
County District Attorney.370 House Democrats urged FBI Director 
Christopher Wray to look into the incident to determine whether federal law 
was broken, but the Bureau has not yet announced any action.371 
 
G. National Emergencies Under Trump 
 
President Trump’s expansive view of executive power proved 
especially dangerous in the time of a global pandemic because of the unclear 
limits of the powers he is permitted to seize under the National Emergencies 
Act. On March 13, 2020, President Trump utilized the processes in the 
National Emergencies Act to declare a national emergency in response to the 
explosive spread of SARS-CoV-2 (“coronavirus”).372 He was vague about 
 
366 See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN FINANCE DATA: DISBURSEMENTS 
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C0058010
0&recipient_name=trump&two_year_transaction_period=2020&line_number=F3P-23 
[perma.cc/3PTU-EZRS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (noting inter alia several $37,541 
payments to Trump Tower and $3,000 payments to Trump Restaurants for “rent,” plus 
thousands more in travel lodging, facility rentals, and “legal & IT consulting”). 
367 52 U.S.C. § 30114. 
368 See Quint Forgey, Raffensberger: Trump Could Face Investigation Over Election Call, 
POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/04/raffensperger-trump-
investigation-call-454478 [perma.cc/H8M4-3C7L] (noting that legal experts and lawmakers 




372 Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337–38 (Mar. 13, 2020) (“NOW, THEREFORE, 
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, by the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 201 and 301 
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) . . . do hereby find and proclaim 
that the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States constitutes a national emergency . . . .”). 
While the virus is often referred to in common parlance as “coronavirus” or “COVID-19,” it 
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what authorities he intended to exercise in response to the pandemic— 
specifying only that he would immediately waive or modify certain 
requirements of the Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s Health 
Insurance programs and of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act Privacy Rule.373  
The emergency declaration was also issued in addition to a prior 
emergency declaration related to illegal immigration from Latin America in 
early 2019 so that he could gain control over sufficient funding to construct 
a wall along the border of Mexico.374 The declaration occurred shortly after 
a five-week shutdown of the federal government, spurred by Democrats’ 
refusal to approve a federal budget that included funding for the wall.375 
Trump declared that, as part of his emergency powers, he would redirect 
money appropriated for various Department of Defense construction projects 
to the wall.376 Democrats were outraged and public watchdog groups sued.377 
Ultimately, a federal judge ruled that while the declaration of the emergency 
was valid, the redirection of funds for the wall was not, because Congress had 
already expressly declined to issue the President funding for that specific 
purpose.378 However, because only the redirection of funds, and not the 
declaration of the emergency itself, was invalid, the emergency status 
remained active.379 Trump extended the emergency twice,380 thus retaining 
some emergency power381 which he used to redirect billions of dollars for 
funding of increased counternarcotic activities along the border with 
 
is actually a specific species of viruses that falls under the larger umbrella of “coronaviruses,” 
and is not analogous to “COVID-19,” as that term refers to the respiratory infection that 
develops in many individuals carrying the virus. See, e.g. Naming the Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, WHO, https://www.who.int/emergencies/ 
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-
(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it. [perma.cc/84L3-ZQGQ] (last visited Nov. 1, 
2021). 
373 Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337–38 (Mar. 13, 2020). 
374 Niv Elis, Trump Extends Emergency Declaration at Border,  THE HILL (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/483039-trump-extends-emergency-declaration-at-border 
[perma.cc/V9JV-FRGN] (noting that for the wall, a prominent promise President Trump 
made repeatedly throughout his campaign, was at the center of a political dispute that 




377 Id., Pete Williams, Judge Rules Trump Violated the Law on Wall Funding With National 





380 Elis, supra note 374. 
381 Williams, supra note 377. 




Mexico.382 This funding, unlike the wall funding, fell within the President’s 
emergency powers because there is no express congressional prohibition 
against the President using funds to fund counternarcotic activities, as there 
was against funding the wall.383 
In many ways, this standoff over funding for the wall echoed Nixon’s 
standoff with Congress over water pollution funding. Even more egregious, 
perhaps, was the fact that Trump’s actions followed a congressional override 
of his veto. Thus, his actions not only seemed to run contrary to Congress’ 
express will, but also sought to undermine the very check the Constitution 
imposes on the executive for this type of situation. 
 
H. Failures to Comply with Freedom of Information Act 
 
1. Persistent FOIA backlog 
 
Finally, agencies under the Trump administration repeatedly failed to 
comply with the Freedom of Information Act, and persistent inefficiencies in 
the FOIA process exacerbated the difficulties bringing those agencies into 
compliance. This was especially concerning because the Trump 
Administration received an unprecedented number of FOIA requests.384 
Republicans argued this was former employees of Hillary Clinton and Barack 
Obama being paid by liberal groups to harass the Republican 
administration.385 Opponents argued it was because of the Trump 
administration’s unusual opacity. Regardless of the reason, the increase in 
requests resulted in a significant backlog that has revealed significant 
shortcomings in the FOIA process.386 This backlog reflects a self-
perpetuating cycle of delay. Many agencies’ FOIA offices are unable to 
timely respond to the increased volume of requests, and therefore those 
 
382 Id. 
383 Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S.Ct. 1 (2019) (“[T]he Government has made a sufficient 
showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting 
Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005 . . . .”); see also, Andrew Arthur, Supreme Court 
Allows Wall Construction to Proceed, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://cis.org/Arthur/Supreme-Court-Allows-Wall-Construction-Proceed [perma.cc/AN5P-
SCQD] (explaining that the Supreme Court found no possible violation of the Department 
of Defense Appropriations Act for using counternarcotics funds to construct the border wall). 
384 H.R. REP. NO. 116-09, at 3, 6–8 (2019). 
385 Id. 
386 See id. at 7 (statement of Rachel Spector, Acting Dep. Chief, FOIA Officer, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior). A FOIA backlog has existed for years. However, under President Trump, the 
backlog has increased drastically. See, e.g., Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits 
Reach Record Highs in FY 2018, THE FOIA PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org 
/2018/11/12/annual-report-foia-lawsuits-reach-record-highs-in-fy-2018/ [perma.cc/F8GP-
458V] (containing detailed data related to FOIA requests, ongoing FOIA related litigation, 
and other metrics relevant to FOIA’s effectiveness). 
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offices are faced with increased litigation in response to failure to comply 
with FOIA. As processers are distracted by litigation, more FOIA requests 
pile up in the backlog, and those too eventually result in litigation. 
Federal agencies have led the effort to address this problem. For 
example, EPA created new offices specifically dedicated to eliminating the 
FOIA backlog.387 Some approaches, however, are transparent efforts to quash 
public records requests. For example, in spring 2020, the FBI temporarily 
stopped accepting electronic FOIA requests entirely, and announced it would 
only respond to mailed requests.388 Since then, the agency has resumed 
processing emailed FOIA requests, but the Information Management 
Division’s FOIA submission website says the agency is still “unable to timely 
process Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests received via 
the eFOIPA portal or by standard mail.389 These approaches appear to run 
directly counter to the goal of increasing government transparency. Thus, 
further reforms to the FOIA process are needed to ensure agencies have the 
resources at their disposal to process FOIA requests in a timely and 
transparent manner. 
 
2. FOIA as applied to Trump in a private capacity 
 
An additional challenge presented by the Trump Administration in 
this context related to President Trump’s status as a private business owner. 
Even before Trump took office, there were widespread complaints that his 
campaign was spending its money improperly at Trump held companies. 
After Trump’s election, these allegations transferred from the Trump 
campaign to the Trump government. For example, a Public Citizen FOIA 
 
387 See H.R. REP. NO. 116-09, supra note 384, at 8 (statement of Tim Epp, Acting Dir., Nat’l 
FOIA Off., U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency) (noting recent creation of EPA’s National FOIA Office 
to centralize FOIA responses as part of broader strategic goal of increasing transparency, 
including eliminating the FOIA backlog). 
388 See Jeanmarie Evelly, Access to Public Information in the Age of COVID-19, CITY LIMITS 
(March 26, 2021), https://citylimits.org/2021/03/26/access-to-public-information-in-the-
age-of-covid-19/ [perma.cc/3P55-HEBU] (“At the national level, certain agencies also 
suspended or severely limited their processing of federal Freedom of Information Act or 
FOIA requests, citing the ongoing emergency: the State Department, for instance, claimed it 
was facing a 96 percent reduction in its ability to handle those requests while the FBI 
dismantled its electronic FOIA portal for about three weeks, according to Gunita Singh, a 
legal fellow with the Reporters Committee.”). 
389 FBI Records: Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, https://efoia.fbi.gov/#home [perma.cc/2HVN-LW64] (last visited Nov. 6, 
2021). 




request revealed that the Secret Service spent thousands of dollars at Trump 
businesses.390 
This problem is especially concerning because of a simple reality: 
FOIA does not apply to private entities, even if they are owned by the 
President.391 Therefore, Trump’s businesses do not have to reveal any 
information when government officials or agencies use their services. The 
only oversight that can be exercised through FOIA comes in the form of 
FOIA requests to specific agencies. The Public Citizen FOIA request against 
the Secret Service is a useful example for understanding how this approach 
works. A journalist or watchdog group must FOIA the agency regarding 
money spent on Trump businesses.392 They must then wait, often years (in 
the case of Public Citizen, it was over three years),393 for the agency to 
provide the information. This information relates only to that specific agency 
and may be incomplete. For example, the Secret Service initially provided 
Public Citizen with an eight-page report before an appellate body within the 
agency eventually ordered production of thousands more pages of 
documents.394 
 
3. Important recent FOIA revelations  
 
Despite these challenges, FOIA has still proven an effective tool for 
government oversight. For example, in 2018, FOIA enabled reporters for a 
number of media outlets to steadily uncover a series of abuses and 
misallocations of funds by former-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt.395 In fact, 
Kevin Chmielewski, the EPA official who blew the whistle on Pruitt initially, 
 
390 Patrick Llewelyn, How We Used FOIA to Hold Trump’s Secret Service Accountable, PUB. 
CITIZEN (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/news/secretservicefoia/ [perma.cc/U6VV-
ZH7M]. 
391 See e.g., What Information Is Not Available Under the FOIA?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/foia/faqs/what-information-is-not-available-under-the-foia/ 
index.html [perma.cc/X8TD-YAFU] (last updated Sept. 17, 2015) (“The FOIA does not 
require a state or local government or a private organization or business to release any records 
directly to the public, whether such records have been submitted to the federal government 
or not. However, records submitted to the federal government by such organizations or 
companies may be available through a FOIA request if they are not protected by a FOIA 
exemption, such as the one covering trade secrets and confidential business information.”). 
392 Llewellyn, supra note 390. 
393 Id. 
394 Id. 
395 Jake Lucas, How Times Reporters Use the Freedom of Information Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 
21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/insider/information-freedom-reporters-
pruitt.html [perma.cc/FD88-STMG]. 
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credits FOIA as the main reason Pruitt was ultimately forced out.396 
Chmielewski analogized his tips to journalists to leaving a trail of 
“breadcrumbs,” which journalists could follow by filing FOIA requests.397 
Ultimately, Pruitt was forced out after documents uncovered through a FOIA 
request revealed he had misspent government funds, including $1560 on 
fountain pens, and abused his office for personal gain, such as by seeking out 
a Chick-Fil-A franchise for his wife.398 
Additionally, in late 2020, a series of FOIA requests were filed by the 
NAACP, ACLU, and others in response to revelations of controversial 
actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security during a summer of 
protests for racial justice in the wake of the high-profile killings of George 
Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and others.399 These FOIA requests could prove 
crucial to obtaining information from the agency, which has grown 
increasingly defiant in its responses to public and Congressional oversight.400 
In light of a series of other disturbing scandals that consumed the agency in 
the second-half of 2020, FOIA will be a tool moving forward to shed light on 
what exactly happened in the Office of Information and Analysis and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement under former Acting Secretary Chad 
Wolfe’s leadership.401 
 




398 ELP FOIA Work Plays Crucial Role in Pruitt Resignation, SIERRA CLUB (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.sierraclub.org/environmental-law/elp-foia-work-plays-crucial-role-pruitt-resig 
nation [perma.cc/48PB-L6P3]. 
399 See e.g. LDF Files FOIA Requests Regarding the Activity of Federal Agents in Portland, 
Oregon, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & ED. FUND (July 17, 2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/press-
release/ldf-files-foia-requests-regarding-the-activity-of-federal-agents-in-portland-oregon/ 
[perma.cc/4NKJ-GYQT]; Jay Stanley & Nicola Morrow, ACLU Seeks Information on 
Government’s Aerial Surveillance of Protestors, ACLU (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/aclu-seeks-information-on-governments-
aerial-surveillance-of-protesters/ [perma.cc/3RY5-PJPK]. 
400 See Jackson Garrity, Homeland Security’s Defiance Presents Vexing Challenge for 
Congressional Oversight, OVERSIGHT PROJECT (Oct. 1, 2020), https://oversightproject.org/ 
2020/10/01/homeland-securitys-defiance-presents-vexing-challenge-for-congressional-
oversight/ [perma.cc/6VRE-92J5] (noting DHS’ refusal to provide information requested by 
Congress during investigation of DHS scandals, and the Acting Secretary’s defiance of a 
congressional subpoena). 
401 In the second half of 2020, a series of disturbing allegations emerged regarding numerous 
DHS sub-agencies. This included allegations that the Office of Information and Analysis had 
conducted warrantless surveillance of peaceful protestors at Black Lives Matter protests in 
Portland, Oregon. Id. At the same time those allegations were coming to light, the Office 
was embroiled in a separate scandal involving allegations that a political appointee had 
specifically instructed staff to ignore intelligence suggesting Russian actors were seeking to 
 




Prior to the Trump administration, FOIA also led to multiple 
important revelations. New York Times reporters uncovered information 
related to the Obama administration’s targeted killing of an American citizen 
without a trial, and uncovered the administration’s internal legal analyses 
related to the lawfulness of Guantanamo Bay detention center.402 FOIA also 
allowed reporters to hold Bush administration Federal Emergency 
Management Act (FEMA) officials accountable for the slow response to 
Hurricane Katrina.403 The information contained in documents released by 
FEMA showed how aid money was spent and how logistics were 
coordinated.404 
 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
A. Priorities for a Post-Trump Congress 
 
Close to half of voters supported Donald Trump in November 2020, 
and millions still falsely believe that President-elect Joe Biden secured the 
presidency through voter fraud.405 Another large section of the country took 
to the streets despite a global pandemic to mark Biden’s win.406 This schism 
undermines the integrity of the federal system of separated powers itself. The 
American public cannot rely on hope alone that a president will not misuse 
their power. For an accountable Executive branch to survive, additional 
legislative reform is needed.407 
 
interfere with the 2020 presidential election. Id. Parallel to those scandals was a 
whistleblower report alleging doctors were performing “mass hysterectomies” on non-
consenting women held in Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities. Laura 
Bonomini, ICE Detention Whistleblower Highlights the Critical Role of Whistleblowers in 
Virtual Oversight, OVERSIGHT PROJECT (Sept. 28, 2020), https://oversightproject.org/ 
2020/09/28/ice-detention-whistleblower-highlights-the-critical-role-of-whistleblowers-in-
virtual-oversight/ [perma.cc/EW7Q-QYWL]. 
402 Lucas, supra note 395. 




405 See Ella Lee, Fact Check: Joe Biden Legally Won Election, Despite Persistent Contrary 
Claims, USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/ 
2020/12/15/fact-check-joe-biden-legally-won-presidential-election/6537586002/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VJN-VXKU]. 
406 Minyvonne Burke & Natalia Abrahams, Biden’s Win Sparks Street Celebrations Around 
the Country, NBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-
election/biden-s-win-sparks-street-celebrations-around-country-n1246922 [https://perma. 
Cc/VXZ4-ZLLU]. 
407 Kimberly Wehle, The Flaw in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, THE BULWARK  
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This Part sketches out—very broadly—some areas that warrant 
immediate possible reform in Congress. The details of optimal legislation 
under each topic are well beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 1. Strengthen Inspector General independence  
 
When the IGA was signed into law, President Jimmy Carter stated an 
IG must “always remember that their ultimate responsibility is not to any 
individual but to the public interest.”408 Yet ironically, Presidents can divert 
the IG’s responsibility from the public interest to themselves as individuals 
because federal law permits them to remove IGs at-will.409 Although the 
current laws make it difficult for IGs to carry out their duties without the fear 
of being ousted for not seeing eye to eye with the president, legislative reform 
should allow for greater IG independence in conjunction with the President’s 
power to appoint.410 
For example, Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut introduced the 
Inspectors General Independence Act to enable IGs to serve seven-year terms 
that can be renewed. Under the bill, if a president wishes to remove an IG, it 
can only be for cause.411 The rationale to extend for-cause removal 
protections to IGs lies in the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, 
which found that the President’s control of the independent counsel “is [not] 
‘so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require’ that they 
be removable at will.”412 This would protect IGs from politically motivated 
firings and increase the likelihood that an IG’s actions are independent and 
not affected by the threat of termination.413  
 
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.thebulwark.com/the-flaw-in-the-twenty-fifth-amendment/ 
[perma.cc/JSX6-UP2L] (“This is really where the Constitution has broken down. The 
Constitution is not self-executing. It is a piece of paper. It is only so good as it is enforced 
and respected.”). 
408 OIG History, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.oig.dot.gov/ 
about-oig/oig-history [perma.cc/B6QF-GFRH] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).   
409 Saikrishna Prakash, Trump Has Declared War on Inspectors General. The System Can 
Still Be Saved., WASH. POST (May 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ 
inspectors-general-independence-constitution-executive/2020/05/22/bb6be092-9b79-11ea-
ac72-3841fcc9b35f_story.html [perma.cc/D9ZY-9CJF] (“Federal law allows presidents to 
remove most inspectors general at will.”). 
410 See id. (suggesting “for cause” protections for IGs, or vesting power-to-fire only in the 
chief IG rather than the President, as a way to insulate IGs from pressure). 
411 Murphy, Cooper Announce Legislation to Safeguard Inspectors General From 




412 Prakash, supra note 409. 
413 Murphy, supra note 411. 




Regarding vacant IG positions, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act can 
be updated to require that “only the deputy IG, a senior official from the IG 
office or a senior officer within the broader IG community” can serve as 
acting IGs until the position is filled.414 This change would minimize the 
extent to which a president could replace IGs with their political allies by 
instead requiring them to choose from individuals already in the IG’s office. 
Combined with the seven-year term reform, such a mechanism would enable 
IGs to have more independent control of their offices and foster better 
communication between different departments and agencies given the 
potential pool of candidates for filling potential vacancies.  
Alternatively, Congress could create an entirely new role of Chief IG, 
who would be appointed by the President and removable at-will with 
delegated power to appoint and remove agency IGs for cause.415 Thus, the 
IGs beneath the Chief IG would be viewed as more independent—much like 
the special counsel under DOJ regulations—and presidents would be more 
likely to face political scrutiny for firing a Chief IG for failing to execute a 
removal order.416  
Relatedly, Congress should consider passing the Merit System 
Protection Board Empowerment Act of 2020.417 This Act would reauthorize 
the Merit System Protection Board, which has been unable to investigate 
whistleblower complaints under its jurisdiction for over a year,418 and would 
grant the Board authority to proactively survey federal employees to ensure 






414 Troy Cribb, Five Ways Congress Can Strengthen the Independence of Inspectors General, 
P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. (July 1, 2021), https://ourpublicservice.org/blog/five-ways-congress-
can-strengthen-the-independence-of-inspectors-general/ [perma.cc/UM54-HC4T]. 
415 Prakash, supra note 409. 
416 Id. 
417 H.R. 7864, 116 Cong. (2020); see also Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 
Connolly, Maloney Introduce the Merit System Protection Board Empowerment Act of 2020 
(July 30, 2020) [hereinafter House Oversight Committee Press Release], https://oversight. 
house.gov/news/press-releases/connolly-maloney-introduce-the-merit-systems-protection-
board-empowerment-act-of [perma.cc/DU5H-7THB]. 
418 House Oversight Committee Press Release, supra note. 417; see also Ana Popovich, U.S. 
Merit System Protection Board Plagued by Structural Defects, WHISTLEBLOWER NEWS 
NETWORK (July 10, 2020), https://whistleblowersblog.org/2020/07/articles/government-
whistleblowers/u-s-merit-system-protection-board-plagued-by-structural-defects/ 
(discussing how under the Trump administration, the MSPB was essentially rendered useless 
because it lacked Senate confirmed members, and relatedly federal whistleblower complaints 
sat in unadjudicated limbo). 
419 House Oversight Committee Press Release, supra note 417. 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
100 
2. Streamline FOIA 
 
The Supreme Court teed up a potential necessary change to the FOIA 
in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, in which environmentalists 
challenged the failure by the Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service [together, the “Services”] to produce a “draft” biological 
opinion requested by the environmentalists under FOIA.420 The draft was 
produced by agency officials as part of a rulemaking by the EPA to assess the 
impact the rule would have on a species protected under the Endangered 
Species Act.421 Because the drafts were not the final position taken by the 
Service with respect to the rule, and because the EPA had not yet finalized 
the rule itself, the Service cited FOIA’s deliberative process exemption as 
precluding the drafts from public reach through FOIA.422The ACLU and 
CREW filed a joint amicus brief with the Court arguing the case “presents an 
important opportunity for the Supreme Court to affirm the American public’s 
right of access to documents outlining government procedures under FOIA 
and limit the scope for which the government can . . . keep documents 
secret.”423 As these groups argued in their brief, the question turned on 
whether the Court views the exemptions within FOIA as identifying narrow 
categories of documents protected only when necessary to enhance agency 
decision making, or whether these exemptions enable broad confidentiality 
from the public.424  
In her first opinion on the Supreme Court, Justice Amy Coney Barrett 
wrote for the majority that the draft was exempt from FOIA, thereby 
increasing the scope of the deliberative process exemption to FOIA. Under 
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(5), the Services must share final drafts with the action 
agency (here, EPA) before declaring the draft “finalized.”425 Yet, Barrett held 
that the draft biological opinion did not need to be shared under that 
regulation. This is problematic because, if a draft document influences EPA’s 
thinking on the subject so as to result in the agency amending its proposed 
 
420 141 S. Ct. 777, 783–84 (2021). 
421 Id. 
422 Id. 
423 U..S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.aclu. 
org/cases/us-fish-and-wildlife-service-v-sierra-club [perma.cc/ZKD4-MX83]. 
424 See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 777 (2021) (No. 19-574), https://www.aclu.org/legal-
document/us-v-sierra-club-brief-amici-curiae-aclu-et-al [perma.cc/C3RP-D8AM] (arguing 
the purpose of the deliberative process privilege is a narrow exception to the broad 
presumption that FOIA creates a right for the public to access government records, and that 
whether it applies should turn on whether the administrative context in which it was created 
is one which is enhanced when agency official’s discussions are shielded from the public 
eye). 
425 Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. at 785. 




rule, the draft has the practical effect of being final within the Services. In 
this way, Barrett’s opinion creates a loophole, because an agency can change 
its rule based on a draft without ever declaring the draft to be final, thus 
exempting the draft from FOIA despite its tangible effect on the outcome of 
the rulemaking process.  
The majority asserted that the draft did not have “real operative 
effect” because it did not change the “legal regime to which agency action is 
subject.”426 However, as the dissenting justices point out, the majority’s 
reasoning applies the deliberative process privilege in a way that allows the 
action agency to choose whether a document is labeled as “final” or a “draft,” 
and thus alter whether it is subject to FOIA.427 The majority opinion does not 
draw a clear limit on the discretion of the action agency to decide whether a 
document is final or not.428  
In light of this broad holding, Congress should step in and clarify that 
where a draft has “real operative effect,” it is no longer protected under the 
deliberative process exemption. Congress should also make clear that a “real 
operative effect” is one which results in substantive changes to the action 
agency’s proposed course of action.429  
There remains the larger problem of the persistent FOIA backlog, as 
well. Of course, the FOIA backlog was not new to the Trump administration, 
but the sheer volume and nature of the scandals that the administration 
generated heightened the need to address the problem. The GAO and DOJ’s 
Office of Information Policy have proposed new regulations to expedite the 
process by encouraging greater proactive disclosure of information by 
agencies.430 However, it remains unclear whether those regulatory changes 
will adequately address the problem. Congress should work with GAO and 
DOJ to develop a legislative approach to streamline the process and 





426 Id. at 786–87 (internal citation omitted). 
427 Id. at 789 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
428 Id. at 786. 
429 See id. at 789–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
430 GAO, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: FEDERAL AGENCIES’ RECENT IMPLEMENTATION 
EFFORTS 1, 3, 12 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/705284.pdf [perma.cc/353S-
LGFP] (outlining GAO and OIP’s recommended changes to FOIA implementing regulations 
in agencies across the federal administrative state). The FOIA’s proactive disclosure 
provisions are intended to ensure that the public has ready access to certain key information 
about their government without the need to make a FOIA request. Proactive Disclosure of 
Non-Exempt Agency Information: Making Information Available Without the Need to File a 
FOIA Request, DEP’T JUST., (last updated July 26, 2021) https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-
guidance/proactive_disclosure_of_non-exempt_information. 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
102 
3. Improve FISA compliance  
 
The PATRIOT Act lowered the standard for collecting foreign 
intelligence information as a “primary” purpose to a “significant” purpose of 
the investigation.431 Although the burden of proof standard has lowered, the 
meaning of “significant” is still undefined.432 This lack of clarity has allowed 
federal agencies like the NSA to conduct upstream surveillance on all 
international communications made by Americans.433 There was previously 
litigation filed by the ACLU and other First Amendment non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) regarding this matter, in which the NGOs claimed civil 
litigants must be able to challenge FISA surveillance because “it is critical 
that those directly affected by mass foreign intelligence surveillance be able 
to obtain judicial review.”434 Those claims were ultimately struck down by 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.435 The 
Fourth Circuit upheld that dismissal in September 2021.436  
The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act would limit the FBI’s ability 
to seek FISA surveillance orders, precluding their collection on an “ongoing 
basis,” for example, as well as “cellular or GPS location information,” and 
applicants must certify that DOJ is aware of “any information that might raise 
doubts about the application.”437 The bill would also limit retention of FISA 
information to five years, increase criminal penalties for violations, and 
impose strict internal compliance and auditing mechanisms so that courts can 








431 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/ [perma.cc/6QTY-RVN5] (last visited Sept. 28, 
2021). 
432 Id. 
433 Wikimedia v. NSA—Challenge to Upstream Surveillance Under the FISA Amendments 
Act, ACLU (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/cases/wikimedia-v-nsa-challenge-up 
stream-surveillance-under-fisa-amendments-act [perma.cc/KMB4-VRU4]. 
434 ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., supra note 431. 
435 Lawsuit: Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUM. 
UNIV., https://knightcolumbia.org/cases/wikimedia--v-nsa. [perma.cc/9KEM-CJLS] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2021). 
436 See Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 14 F.4th 276 (4th Cir. 2021). 
437 H.R. 6172, 116th Cong. (2020). 
438 Id. §104(a)(3) (limiting retention time); id. § 205(b) (increasing penalties); id. §605 
(establishing compliance mechanisms). 




4. Strengthen special prosecutor independence  
 
In the wake of the Mueller investigation, Congress needs to 
articulate—once again—the boundaries of executive branch investigations of 
sitting presidents.439 The existing ban on prosecting presidents is contained 
in two Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda, which are not laws, and 
have not gone through the advocacy process that would produce a controlling 
judicial opinion.440  
The current guidelines, issued in 1973 and 2000 by OLC,441 were 
nonetheless binding on Mueller because the special counsel—an agent of 
DOJ—produced what amounted to an ambiguous report that obscured 
Trump’s legal violations, including possible obstruction of justice.442 
Because the guidelines were issued by an executive agency and without even 
the benefit of notice-and-comment procedures, they do not reflect the will of 
Congress, and in fact appear to undermine constitutional safeguards on the 
executive branch.443 Therefore, Congress should pass a statute overriding 
them, as it did post-Watergate, and specify the circumstances under which 
presidents can be indicted and the tolling of statutes of limitations to enable 
prosecutions after a president leaves office.444  
 
 5. Reform FACA 
 
Although federal advisory boards and committees enjoy a great deal 
of autonomy under FACA, they remain subject to judicial review.445 In a 
2020 case, the EPA argued that it was justified in forbidding those who 
 
439 Jennifer Rubin, Four Big Constitutional Fixes We Need, Thanks to Trump, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/26/four-big-constit 
utional-fixes-we-need-thanks-trump/ [perma.cc/9NPD-M6LG]. 
440 See, e.g., Kimberly Wehle, “Law and” The OLC’s Article II Immunity Memos, 32 STAN. 
L. POL’Y. REV. 1, 41–47 (explaining OLC memos may either be considered categorical 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion on the part of DOJ not to prosecute a sitting president 
or constitute non-legislative administrative rules). 
441 Id. at 21–23. 
442 Rubin, supra note 439; Wehle, supra note 440 at 5–6. 
443 See Wehle, supra note 440, at 41–45 (explaining the proper sources of law under our 
constitutional framework are congressional lawmaking, judicial interpretation of the laws, 
and the power of states to institute their own laws). 
444 See id. at 47–54 (arguing Congress should solve the constitutional ambiguity and reform 
prosecutorial procedures for sitting presidents). 
445 Seth Jaffe, EPA’s Limits on Advisory Committee Participation Are Subject to Judicial 
Review, FOLEY HOAG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.lawandenvironment.com/2020/03/27/ 
epas-limits-on-advisory-committee-participation-are-subject-to-judicial-review/ 
[perma.cc/J3MB-F5TU]. 
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received EPA grants from serving on the EPA advisory committee.446 The 
First Circuit explained that although FACA was enacted to avoid undue 
influence by the regulated community on federal advisory committees, the 
EPA’s advisory committees must be balanced sufficiently to be able to 
provide independent advice and to “clearly [require] agency heads at least to 
consider whether new restraints on committee membership might 
inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such 
restraints when they do so.”447 Congress should revisit FACA in light of 
modern developments in technology and political realities to ensure that 
decision-makers are not unduly influenced by certain interests without public 
scrutiny. 
 
 6. Amend the FEC 
 
Because President Trump left the FEC without a quorum, the agency 
was powerless to investigate campaign finance law violations during his 
administration.448 Congress must amend FECA to create a mechanism to 
ensure empty Commission seats are immediately filled to facilitate a quorum, 
particularly in an election year. Otherwise, the country is vulnerable to the 
corrupting influence of improper contributions in politics. In addition to 
continued threats of foreign election interference, there remains the 
possibility that incidents similar to the ITT affair could occur again.  
 
B. Additional Legislative Needs 
 
The years following Nixon’s Watergate scandal ushered in multiple 
measures to hold the Executive accountable and prevent misconduct, but 
those measures are not used to their full potential. Agencies are mainly under 
the control of the Executive, and vague laws in their current state are just 
words scrawled on paper with no real bite. That has thrown off the scale of 
equivalent separated powers, leaving an imbalanced system that favors the 
Executive. Lack of transparency and accountability is not something uniquely 
tied to the Trump administration. Still, it ran rampant under Trump. This is 
why, similar to post-Watergate, another era of legislative reform is needed to 
 
446 See Union of Concerned Scientists v., Wheeler, 954 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing 
the appearance or reality of potential interference with board members’ ability to serve 
independently and objectively). 
447 Id. at 19; Jaffe, supra note 445; Union of Concerned Scientists, Big Win! Court Questions 
EPA Limits on Science Advisory Committees, ECOWATCH (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.ecowatch.com/epa-science-advisory-limits-win-2645574831.html?rebelltitem 
=2#rebelltitem2 [perma.cc/TT7U-QXHN] (citation omitted). 
448 Levinthal, supra note 357. 




ensure that in the future, mistrust in the executive branch does not reach the 
levels that we see today.  
The foregoing discussion focused on amendments to pre-existing 
legislation that was passed to address the abuses of Watergate. Congress 
needs to do even more, as the abuses of the Trump administration stretched 
beyond what even Richard Nixon attempted. 
 
1. Legislatively implement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
 
When it was first incorporated into the Constitution, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment was designed to serve two purposes—to clarify the line of 
succession in the event the president dies, resigns, or is disabled; and to 
clarify how the role of vice president is to be filled if it ever becomes 
vacant.449 Some scholars have argued the amendment could be used as a 
“mutiny provision,” allowing the presidential Cabinet to rein in a president 
who is unwilling to discharge his duties for reasons other than physical 
disability.450 Experts have warned that the amendment as written is 
insufficient to check a president where doing so is necessary and Congress is 
otherwise unwilling to act.451 
President Trump tested positive for COVID-19 and was hospitalized 
amid a global pandemic.452 Given his age at the time of infection and the 
election of Biden, who is also well into his senior citizen years, it would have 
been beneficial to have a plan in place to transition quickly had his health 
declined rapidly. Furthermore, legitimate discussions of invoking the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment arose in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021 
insurrection at the U.S. Capitol Building, which was widely blamed on  
 
449 See Kimberly Wehle, Nice Idea, But 25th Amendment is No Fix for a Dysfunctional 
President, THE HILL (Sept. 11, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/405952-nice-
idea-but-25th-amendment-is-no-fix-for-a-dysfunctional-presidency [perma.cc/7TDW- 
GLVN)] [hereinafter Wehle, Nice Idea]. 
450 Id. 
451 Id. (“[A]t the end of the day, impeachment remains the best bet for addressing fatal 
problems with an incumbent presidency. And if Congress is unwilling to take that step, it’s 
not likely to pull the Section 4 trigger, either. Ultimately, therefore, it’s up to voters to keep 
a close eye on things by exercising their prerogative to hire and fire at the ballot booth.”). 
452 Christine Wang & Mike Calia, President Trump, First Lady Melania Test Positive for 
Coronavirus, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/02/president-donald-
trump-says-he-has-tested-positive-for-coronavirus.html [perma.cc/C27L-U8SA]. 
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Trump.453 But if a vice president is unwilling to activate Section Four of the 
Amendment or obtain the requisite number of cabinet members, power may 
not be transferred from a president.454   
The holes in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflect a broader theme 
underlying many issues discussed throughout this paper—that the “the 
Constitution mostly runs on the honor system.”455 The Trump administration 
demonstrated that, where a President does not act in good faith to execute and 
obey the laws of the United States, there must be consequences with teeth. 
Writer Jennifer Rubin has thus argued Congress should pass legislation 
requiring presidents, in writing, to designate mechanisms for transferring 
powers if they become disabled.456 To assess mental and physical fitness, a 
president may be required to have a yearly physical examination and submit 
the report by waiving doctor-patient privilege.457 A president may specify the 
circumstances under which such transfer of power would be activated.458 This 
may be constitutionally tricky, but given the advanced age of our recently 
elected presidents and unexpected circumstances like the global pandemic 
crisis, it would be wise for Congress to consider legislation implementing the 
25th Amendment with more specificity and transparency.459 Such a change 
would strip the President of unchecked discretion to determine whether they 
are unable to discharge the duties of the office.460 
 
2. Pass the For the People Act 
 
Congress has already introduced legislation known as “For the People 
Act” in both the House (H.R. 1)461 and Senate (S.1),462 which would stave off 
the confusion and misinformation that culminated in January 6 with national 
automatic voter registration,463 provide an answer to partisan 
 
453 See, e.g., John Hudak, Invoke the 25th Amendment to Save the Country From Donald 




455 See Wehle, Nice Idea, supra note 449 (“Of course, the notion that an ailing Donald Trump 
would step aside from his position as the most powerful man in the world for the good of the 
country is sheer folly. It would never happen.”). 




460 Wehle, Nice Idea, supra note 449. 
461 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021). 
462 S. 949, 116th Cong. (2019). 
463 Id. at Div. A, Tit. I, Sub. A, Pt. 1, Pt. 2. 




gerrymandering,464 reform campaign finance laws,465 and revise federal 
ethics rules.466 The John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act (S. 4263) 
would also restore a key portion of the Voting Rights Act that was gutted by 
the Supreme Court in 2013.467 (The full range of potential federal changes to 
voting and election laws—and the need for a constitutional amendment 
enshrining an affirmative right to vote for citizens, although vital, are outside 
the scope of this article.) 
 
3. Amend the Electoral Count Act of 1887 
 
Importantly, Congress must immediately revisit the Electoral Count 
Act of 1887, an arcane and ambiguous law that prompted much mischief in 
2020—including a threat that State legislatures could ignore the popular vote 
and legislate a slate of electors for Trump within a “safe harbor” deadline 
under the statute.468 The act also sets forth the procedures governing 
congressional objections to state certifications of Electoral College votes on 
January 6.469 The law should be amended to foreclose abject political 
objections made without factual or legal justification—like those promoting 










464 Id. at Div. A, Tit. II, Sub. E. 
465 Id. at Div. B, Tit. IV. 
466 Id. at Div. C, Tit. VII. 
467 See John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, S. 4263, 116th Cong. (2020) (expanding 
the protections of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
468 3 U.S.C. § 15; Nick Corasaniti, Sydney Ember & Alan Feuer, The Nation Reached ‘Safe 
Harbor.’ Here’s What That Means, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/12/08/us/politics/election-safe-harbor-deadline.html [perma.cc/PW56-GAW9] (“A 
relatively obscure passage of the Electoral Count Act of 1887 says that if there are disputes 
in a state over the results of an election, but the results are settled “at least six days before 
the time fixed for the meeting of electors,” those results are conclusive and must be counted 
by Congress. That’s what is known as the safe harbor deadline.”). 
469 3 U.S.C. § 15. 
470 See Melissa Block, Can the Forces Unleashed by Trump’s Big Election Lie Be Undone?, 
NPR (Jan. 16, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/15/957141129/can-the-forces-unleashed 
-by-trumps-big-election-lie-be-undone [perma.cc/KD6M-796N] (explaining that among the 
thousands of falsehoods Trump uttered during his presidency, his insistence he won the 2020 
presidential election by a landslide earned the distinction of being called the “big lie”). 
         Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [December 2021 
 
   
 
108 
4. Pass impeachment procedure legislation 
 
Donald Trump’s second impeachment trial—like his first— 
highlighted some critical gaps in the Constitution which, despite mentioning 
impeachment six times,471 left vague a number of questions that were left to 
internal Senate maneuvering and politics. These included the question of 
whether a president can be tried after leaving office so long as he is 
impeached while still in office (the Senate answered this twice in the 
affirmative on bipartisan votes, but Republicans voting for acquittal used it 
as a guise for avoiding conviction of a member of their own party); 472 
whether the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court should preside under those 
circumstances (Chief Justice Roberts unilaterally bowed out, despite a lack 
of a case or controversy presenting that question for resolution); 473 whether 
ex parte communications between Senators and defense counsel are 
permitted (this happened among Senators Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham, 
 
471 U.S. CONST. Art. 1 § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and 
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. Art. 1 § 3 (“The Senate 
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall 
be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice 
shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the 
Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or 
Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject 
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”); Art. 2 § 3 (“[The 
President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United 
States, except in Cases of Impeachment . . . .”); id. Art. 2 § 4 (“The President, Vice President 
and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); id. Art. 
III § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury . . . .”). 
472 See Kathryn Watson, Melissa Quinn, Grace Segers & Stefan Becket, Senate Finds Trump 
Impeachment Trial Constitutional on First Day of the Proceedings, CBS NEWS  
(Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-impeachment-trial-senate-
constitutional-day-1/ [perma.cc/J8HL-R4PT] (reporting the Senate determined the 
constitutionality of the Trump trial); Frank O. Bowman, III, “The Constitutionality of Trying 
a Former President Impeached While in Office,” LAWFARE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.law 
fareblog.com/constitutionality-trying-former-president-impeached-while-office 
[https://perma.cc/NX7G-CKZE] (explaining the Senate has twice set a precedent that a civil 
official may be tried by the Senate after leaving office so long as they are impeached while 
still in office, explaining “first, the case of Sen. William Blount, who in 1797-1798 was 
impeached by the House, expelled from the Senate, and then tried by the Senate, in that order, 
and, second, the case Secretary of War William Belknap, who in 1876 was both impeached 
and tried after he left office. But those cases hardly buttress Bobbitt’s position.”). 
473 Amy Howe, Roberts Will Not Preside Over Impeachment Trial, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 
2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/01/roberts-will-not-preside-over-impeachment-
trial/ [perma.cc/5BZC-BY54]. 




with no accountability or serious pushback);474 and the circumstances under 
which calling witnesses is appropriate—i.e., if there remains a question of 
fact salient to the underlying legal charge.475  On that final point, 
implementation of some form of rules of evidence would ensure that the trial 
does not become a “political circus” that weakens the integrity of the system. 
 
5. Mandate compliance with the Advice and Consent Clause 
 
Infamously, Donald Trump used the power to designate “acting” 
officials in lieu of putting his picks for Cabinet-level and other posts requiring 
Senate confirmation under the scrutiny of the Constitution’s Advice and 
Consent Clause.476 He also installed his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, as 
a de facto diplomat and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, as the head of an 
assortment of executive functions, including the COVID-19 relief response 
task force.477 Congress must pass legislation establishing an alternative 
procedure for filling open posts that cannot function as an end run around its 
advice and consent prerogative, thereby precluding presidents from 
outsourcing the functions of the office to personal loyalists who are not even 
government employees. To be sure, the details of such legislation are not self-
evident, but the necessity for it is. 
 
6. Implement the Emoluments Clauses 
 
The Framers of the Constitution were crystal clear about one thing: 
the presidency was not to be a personal money-making machine. To that end, 
Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution prohibits presidents from 
 
474 Kelsey Vlamis, Three GOP Senators Met with Trump’s Lawyers the Day Before Their 
Planned Impeachment Defense Presentation, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.bus 
inessinsider.com/3-gop-senators-met-trump-lawyers-day-before-defense-presentation-
2021-2 [perma.cc/E2FA-8E5S]. 
475 Renato Mariotti, Witnesses Could Prevent a Foregone Conclusion in Second 
Impeachment Trial, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/ 
2021/02/08/witnesses-could-prevent-a-foregone-conclusion-in-second-impeachment-trial-
467177 [perma.cc/E2FA-8E5S]. 
476 Amanda Becker, Trump Says Acting Cabinet Members Give Him 'More Flexibility', 
REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2019) www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-cabinet/trump-says-acting-
cabinet-members-give-him-more-flexibility-idUSKCN1P00IG [perma.cc/688S-PBPJ]; U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2. 
477 See Jill Colvin, Giuliani Brags About Forcing Out Trump’s Ukraine Ambassador, AP 
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-donald-trump-us-news-ap-top-news-
international-news-37d6c911d3d89c2fe5c101756f028a57 [perma.cc/PKR7-5HF6] 
(reporting that President Trump‘s attorney Giuliani began openly discussing his efforts to 
have the American ambassador to Ukraine removed); Brian Bennett, Inside Jared Kushner’s 
Unusual White House Role, TIME (Jan. 16, 2020), https://time.com/5766186/jared-kushner-
interview/ [https://perma.cc/HXW6-EDQA]. 
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receiving gifts from foreign states and monarchies.478 Article II, Section 1, 
Paragraph 7 prohibits the president from receiving any “Emolument” from 
the federal government or the states beyond “a Compensation” for his 
“Services” as chief executive.479 Unlike prior presidents, Trump refused to 
divest his private assets upon ascending to the presidency and made money 
off of his properties through the use of Secret Service details and the 
conducting of business.480  
Congress needs to implement presidential divestiture and disclosure 
laws and legislate a cause of action for Emoluments Clause violations to 
ensure accountability for non-compliance through the courts.481 For starters, 
it should pass a statute requiring liquidation of a president’s business holdings 
through a blind trust agreement once they enter the office.482 This would 
eliminate ethical problems from arising as a result of a president’s 
holdings.483 To address a president’s conduct in office, there needs to be a 
clear statutory definition of “emoluments” to prohibit a president from 
accepting gifts (and defining that term) unless Congress approves explicitly. 
Also, if a president violates this ban, a remedy of forfeiture should be 
established.484 
 
7. Impose consequences for illegally impounded funds   
 
As shown under both Nixon and Trump, Congress must impose 
tangible consequences for agencies when funds are impounded for political 
reasons. These could include administrative disciplinary measures modeled 
on the reporting requirement and non-criminal penalties for violations of the 
Antideficiency Act. 485 The Congressional Power of the Purse Act, a bill 
 
478 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
479 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, ¶ 7. 
480 See Gabe Lezra, Profiting off the Presidency: Trump’s Violations of the Emoluments 
Clauses, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/profiting-
off-the-presidency-trumps-violations-of-the-emoluments-clauses/ [perma.cc/AW6E-
5Y9B]. 
481 Rubin, supra note 439. 
482 Id. 
483 Patrick Healy, To Avoid Conflicts, Clintons Liquidate Holdings, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/us/politics/15clintons.html [perma.cc/B9XK-
EBQM]. 
484 Rubin, supra note 439. 
485 See Congressional Power of the Purse Act, Section-by-Section Analysis, S. 
APPROPRIATIONS COMM. 2, 2, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Power%20of%20the%20Purse%20Section%20by%20Section_Senate%20Bill.pdf 
(analyzing components of the Power of the Purse Act including Section 105’s penalties for 
failure to comply with the Impoundment Control Act of 1974). 




proposed in June 2020 by Senator Patrick Leahy,486 includes penalty 
provisions aimed at deterring future executive officials from supporting 
rogue presidents who use public funding to further their own political aims.487 
 
8. Reform the National Emergencies Act 
 
In 2019, Senator Mike Lee introduced the Article One Act to place 
greater constraints on the ability of a president to declare national 
emergencies.488 Under the Article One Act, national emergencies would 
automatically expire after thirty days unless expressly approved by 
Congress.489 The emergencies would also have to be renewed every year or 
otherwise expire.490 However, the Act has not been passed in the time since 
its introduction.  
In 2020, former Representative Justin Amash likewise introduced the 
National Emergencies Reform Act.491 This Act involved even stricter 
constraints than proposed in the Article One Act. It would give Congress only 
two days to decide whether to authorize a presidential declaration of 
emergency, and if Congress failed to act in that timeframe the declaration 
would expire.492 Congress would also be required to renew the emergency 
authorization every sixty days, rather than every year.493 Like the Article One 
Act, the National Emergencies Reform Act did not move forward after its 
introduction in the House Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management. 
Either of these proposals would go a long way to ending the 
languishing states of emergencies declared by presidents and reduce the 
likelihood of future executives abusing the broad authority given to them 
under the National Emergencies Act. Congress should identify which 
timeframe properly balances the need to restrain executive authority and the 
need for Congress to carefully deliberate whether to approve a particular 
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Watergate was a tipping point in American history in which the nation 
was forced to confront corruption on a scale that had never been seen in the 
federal government. In response, Congress passed reforms intended to ensure 
that level of corruption could never be repeated. For decades, those reforms 
were viewed as effective solutions, but all the while issues festered just 
outside the public eye. This included a growing FOIA backlog, persecution 
of whistleblowers and independent investigators, and other serious concerns. 
Like Nixon’s Watergate, the Trump presidency may be another watershed 
moment for federal oversight. The Trump administration laid bare the 
weaknesses that remain in oversight laws. To seal the gaps left by the post-
Watergate reform laws, Congress must act by passing laws providing 
independent investigators and public watchdog groups with the tools 
necessary to protect our nation’s democracy. 
These tools will take many forms. Oversight entities such as the FEC, 
Office of Government Ethics, and FISA courts must be given greater 
authorities. Independent officials, such as independent counsels and 
inspectors general, must be given greater protections so they can pursue their 
missions without interference. Likewise, the whistleblowers they rely upon 
must also be protected, including through a renewed MSPB. And public 
actors, such as the free press and oversight-oriented nonprofits, must be given 
a re-tooled FOIA and FACA to ensure they have access to information of 
importance to the public at-large.  
Beyond shoring up post-Watergate reforms, Congress has spadework 
to do around the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Emoluments Clauses, the 
Advice and Consent Clause, the Impeachment Clauses, as well as voting 
rights and the procedures for calculating Electoral College votes. By ensuring 
investigative powers are widely held and effectively equipped among actors 
inside and outside of the federal government, Congress can build greater 
accountability into our constitutional system, and will help Americans rest 
easy knowing that our democratic values are not vulnerable to theft by corrupt 
officials working for their own political or personal ends. 
 
